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STATE DEFAULT AND SYNTHETIC BANKRUPTCY 
Richard M. Hynes* 
Abstract: An insolvent state does not need bankruptcy if sovereign immunity would 
protect it from lawsuits and other collection efforts. To the extent that a state is not judgment-
proof and needs bankruptcy, we may not need to modify the Federal Bankruptcy Code to 
allow it to file. First, a substantial share of state spending flows through their municipalities, 
and these municipalities have substantial obligations of their own. Unlike states, 
municipalities can file for bankruptcy under current law, and a state could substantially 
reduce the cost of accomplishing its own fiscal goals by forcing its municipalities to file. 
Second, states may be able to create their own synthetic “bankruptcy” mechanisms, or 
bankruptcy without the federal code. State obligations are creatures of state law; states do not 
need a federal bankruptcy discharge. Federal law would not preempt a state composition 
mechanism used to adjust these debts, and any adjustment that would have been confirmed 
by a bankruptcy court would likely survive a Contract Clause challenge as well. Even if a 
state does not enact a composition mechanism, it could capture most of the benefits of federal 
bankruptcy by directly altering the rights of its creditors. A synthetic bankruptcy mechanism 
created by a state would not precisely replicate a federal bankruptcy chapter for states. 
Perhaps the best argument for federal bankruptcy is that it could operate with significantly 
lower transactions costs. In a world without omniscient judges, however, transactions costs 
can actually increase welfare by enhancing the ability of a state to make credible 
commitments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Some scholars and politicians have called for a change in law1 that 
would allow states to file for bankruptcy under the federal code.2 At the 
moment, states don’t need bankruptcy protection. States have relatively 
little debt, at least if we define debt narrowly to mean liabilities owed to 
capital markets.3 More importantly, if a state truly wants to default, there 
                                                     
1. Although the current bankruptcy code allows municipalities (e.g. Los Angeles County) to file, 
states (e.g. California) cannot file. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (“[O]nly a person that resides or 
has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a 
debtor [in bankruptcy].”). A state is a “governmental unit,” id. § 101(a)(27), and therefore not a 
“person,” id. §101(a)(41). 
2. See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy,” 59 UCLA L. REV. 322 
(2011); David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012); Jeb Bush & Newt 
Gingrich, Better Off Bankrupt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/opinion/la-oe-gingrich-bankruptcy-20110127. Of course, 
other scholars and politicians oppose a new bankruptcy chapter for states. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, 
Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 888 (2012); Adam 
J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and The Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898775; NGA Statement 
Regarding Bankruptcy Proposals for States, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-room/news-releases/page_2011/col2-content/ 
main-content-list/nga-statement-regarding-bankrupt.html. 
3. California and Illinois are perhaps the states most frequently mentioned as suffering financial 
distress, yet they each spend less than 6% of their general fund revenue servicing their debt. See 
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may be very little that its creditors can do to force the state to pay. The 
Eleventh Amendment prevents nearly all creditors from suing a state in 
federal court without the state’s consent, and sovereign immunity allows 
the state to prevent most creditors from suing in state court as well.4 
Even if a state’s creditors do manage to sue, existing Contract Clause 
doctrine allows a state to use its financial distress to excuse its non-
performance.5 In other words, non-bankruptcy law can resolve state 
financial distress tolerably well. It did so both when states defaulted on 
their bonds in the nineteenth century6 and when states unilaterally 
altered their (or their municipalities’) collective bargaining agreements 
in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.7 
Although states don’t need bankruptcy protection at the moment, we 
may someday want an insolvent state to use bankruptcy to return to 
solvency. Payments to bondholders may not currently comprise a 
significant portion of a state’s budget, but this situation could change if a 
state incurred dramatically more debt and interest rates rose 
significantly. In addition, states have made substantial commitments to 
their current and former workers that may be expensive to keep. If some 
or all of these creditors can sue or exert other pressure on a state, this 
pressure could create problems that bankruptcy is designed to mitigate.8 
Because bonds and similar debts are unlikely to account for a significant 
share of an insolvent state’s obligations, an effective bankruptcy chapter 
must constitute more than a minimalist procedure that leaves the rights 
of current and former workers untouched9 and does not allow a judge to 
                                                     
CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FOR THE 
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2011 (2011) (reporting debt service payments of $5 billion, general 
fund revenue of $95 billion, and total revenue of $192.9 billion), available at 
http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARD/CAFR/cafr11web.pdf; STATE OF ILL. COMPTROLLER, BONDED 
INDEBTEDNESS AND LONG TERM OBLIGATIONS 7 (2010) (claiming that debt service accounted for 
3.9% of revenues), available at http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/linkservid/ 
51E3FD7F-1CC1-DE6E-2F48F3F5A895A821/.  
4. See infra Part II.A. 
5. See infra Part II.B. 
6. See William B. English, Understanding the Cost of Sovereign Default: American State Debts 
in the 1840s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259 (1996); John V. Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 423 (1983). 
7. See Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
Agreements and the Contracts Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
8. These problems include a “debt overhang” that prevents beneficial investment and a collective 
action problem that reduces the aggregate amount collected by all creditors. See infra note 85 and 
accompanying text. 
9. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 345 (“On balance, therefore, this Article proposes that the 
framework not include an explicit right to impair state collective bargaining and pension 
agreements.”). 
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modify the rights of a class of creditors without their approval.10 
This Article does not advocate for the modification of states’ 
obligations to their workers or other creditors. One can reasonably argue 
that a state’s taxpayers or the recipients of its discretionary spending 
should bear the costs of financial distress instead of those to whom the 
state has made promises.11 One can also argue that courts should stay out 
of the matter and leave the resolution to the political process.12 Rather 
than engage these debates, this Article argues that if courts are to play a 
role in deciding whether a state should perform its obligations, states 
should have access to some version of bankruptcy. 
Although states cannot file for protection under the federal 
bankruptcy code, existing law may still allow them to use bankruptcy to 
resolve their insolvency. First, a state could substantially reduce its 
expenses by forcing its municipalities into bankruptcy. The bankruptcy 
code allows municipalities to file,13 and the code defines the term 
“municipality” broadly to mean a “political subdivision or public agency 
or instrumentality of a State.”14 Grants to localities (a subset of 
municipalities) account for more than half of some states’ spending,15 
and many of the obligations reported as state debts are really 
municipality debts.16 If a state can use the federal bankruptcy code to 
reduce the obligations and expenses of its municipalities, it can reduce 
the cost of accomplishing its own goals. 
Second, state law governs the most significant obligations of a state 
and its municipalities, including their bonds, pensions, and collective 
                                                     
10. Id. at 335 (“A minimalist framework can nonetheless provide value without [cramdown].”). 
11. Adam Levitin has characterized the fight over state bankruptcy as a struggle between 
taxpayers and the beneficiaries of government spending. See Adam J. Levitin, Fiscal Federalism 
and the Limits of Bankruptcy, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 214, 216 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. 
Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012) (“But part of the appeal of a Chapter 9-modeled state bankruptcy regime is 
clearly as a sword for one side of the tax hike versus service/benefits cut debate, making it a 
Republican partisan tool.”). The interests of the beneficiaries of government spending are not 
necessarily aligned. For any given level of taxation, the more a state spends on its obligations to its 
workers and other creditors, the less it has available for transfer payments and discretionary 
spending.  
12. See, e.g., Richard Schragger, Democracy and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 883 (2012) (“It is 
quite difficult on democratic grounds to justify allowing a judge to impose particular fiscal ends 
unless the political pathologies of the local and state budgeting process are so wide and deep that 
coercion outside elective politics is required.”). 
13. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
14. Id. § 101(40). For a good discussion of the meaning of “municipality,” see In re Las Vegas 
Monorail Co., 429 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2010). 
15. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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bargaining agreements. Accordingly, states can manipulate the rules 
applicable to their own disputes. Instead of rejecting a collective 
bargaining agreement or proposing a plan of reorganization in 
bankruptcy, a state could enact laws that modify the rights of its 
creditors (including its contractual counter-parties). If sovereign 
immunity does not prevent their lawsuit, creditors would argue that the 
state laws violated the Contract Clause. The court would apply a test that 
is similar to, and perhaps more lenient than, the one it would use in a 
federal bankruptcy reorganization of a state.17 The state and its creditors 
could use aggregate litigation methods to combine the suits in a small 
number of courts to reduce transactions costs.18 In the extreme, a state 
could create its own composition mechanism that would roughly 
replicate a federal bankruptcy chapter for states. 
This Article uses three different definitions of bankruptcy. The 
general term “bankruptcy” is defined broadly to mean a single 
proceeding that compels all creditors to accept “some arrangement or 
disposition of their claims against the bankrupt’s property, whether they 
agreed to it or not.”19 The term “federal bankruptcy” shall mean 
bankruptcy pursuant to the federal bankruptcy code. The term “synthetic 
bankruptcy” shall mean bankruptcy without the federal bankruptcy 
code—either a state composition agreement or the direct alteration of the 
rights of creditors combined with aggregate litigation techniques. 
A state-created synthetic bankruptcy process would not precisely 
replicate a federal bankruptcy chapter for states.20 First, if we are willing 
to substantially dilute notions of state sovereignty, federal bankruptcy 
                                                     
17. See infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text. 
18. For work discussing the similarity between bankruptcy and aggregate litigation methods 
(including class actions) used to resolve mass tort litigation, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: 
The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1344 (1995); Troy A. McKenzie, 
Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Non-Class Resolution of Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Oct. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2034388. 
19. Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1940). 
20. George Triantis also argues that a state could create its own composition mechanism and that 
they are better positioned than the federal government to do so because they have the right 
incentives to contract for the most efficient terms with their creditors. See George Triantis, 
Bankruptcy For the States and By the States, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, 
AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 237, 240 (Peter Conti-Brown & 
David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012) (“This chapter suggests that bankruptcy legislation, however 
designed, should be encouraged at the state government, rather than federal, level. Indeed, the 
federal government should refrain from legislating in this area—or should produce a set of default, 
rather than mandatory, rules—to give states the space and incentive to do so for themselves.”) 
(citation omitted). It is at least possible, however, that a federal bankruptcy chapter would enhance 
the ability of a state to contract with their creditors by making it harder for the state to change the 
resolution procedure at the time of default. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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could reallocate political power in a manner that would allow a more 
timely response to a fiscal crisis.21 Second, federal bankruptcy courts 
have inherent jurisdictional advantages that could allow such courts to 
return a state to solvency with lower transactions costs.22 These 
differences may not be advantages for federal bankruptcy. Good 
justifications could support strong notions of state sovereignty. If 
Congress is unwilling or unable to abandon these notions in the federal 
bankruptcy code, there may be little difference between the political 
process necessary to respond to a fiscal crisis inside or outside of federal 
bankruptcy. If judges are likely to approve modifications when the 
debtor does not “deserve” relief, transactions costs may enhance the 
state’s ability to make commitments. 
To understand the case for a federal bankruptcy chapter for states, we 
must first understand the nature of a state’s finances and the non-
bankruptcy law that would apply if a state were to default. To that end, 
Part I explores the financial condition of the states and the nature of the 
obligations that states are struggling to meet. Part II looks to the past and 
describes the enforcement (or lack thereof) of similar obligations during 
prior financial crises. Part III argues that existing law would allow a 
state to use bankruptcy to resolve its insolvency, either by forcing its 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy under the federal bankruptcy code 
or by creating a synthetic bankruptcy procedure to adjust its own 
obligations. Finally, Part IV compares this synthetic bankruptcy 
approach to a hypothetical new chapter of the federal bankruptcy code 
designed to address state insolvency. 
I. THE NATURE OF A STATE’S FISCAL CRISIS SHOULD 
DICTATE THE STRUCTURE OF THE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISM 
This Part offers three basic lessons about state finance so that the 
remainder of the Article can assess the need for a federal bankruptcy 
chapter for states. Section A argues that states and their municipalities 
resemble complex holding companies. Although a state is legally distinct 
from its municipalities, it relies on these municipalities to accomplish its 
goals. Section B argues that states do not currently spend a significant 
                                                     
21. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 716 (“Rather than requiring the governor and both houses of the 
legislature to propose a restructuring plan, Congress might vest this authority directly in the 
governor, perhaps together with an obligation for the governor to consult with the legislature.”). 
22. Synthetic bankruptcy is not actually bankruptcy, and it may be unable to bind all creditors in a 
single proceeding. See infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
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portion of their budgets servicing debts owed to capital markets. Section 
C argues that states do have significant obligations to their current and 
former workers. 
A. States and Their Municipalities Resemble Complex Holding 
Companies 
When speaking of a state, we must be just as precise as we are (or 
should be) when speaking of a large firm like Citigroup or Exxon. Very 
large firms are almost never single entities. The largest firms have an 
average of more than one hundred subsidiaries,23 each possessing its 
own legal identity, assets, and debt. The various entities in the corporate 
structure are not liable for each other’s debts unless they are co-
borrowers or have issued guarantees. Similarly, states have a large 
number of sub-agencies or instrumentalities such as university systems, 
pension funds, unemployment insurance providers, water districts, 
transit authorities, cities, counties, school districts, etc.24 Much of the 
“state” debt reported in the news is actually owed by these sub-entities.25 
Because each of these entities fits the bankruptcy code’s definition of 
“municipality,”26 this Article will refer to those sub-entities as 
municipalities. Like parent corporations, states are not liable for their 
municipalities’ debts unless they have issued guarantees. Sometimes, 
                                                     
23. See Richard Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 619–
20 (2011) (“The 100 largest U.S. public companies by revenues maintained an average of 109 
foreign-nation subsidiaries, and . . . within the U.S. they had an average of 62 major subsidiaries 
outside Delaware (in addition to 74 incorporated in Delaware).”). 
24. See, e.g., CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, supra note 3, at 30 (showing that the major 
“component units” of the State of California are the University of California, State Compensation 
Insurance Fund, California Housing Finance Agency, and Public Employees’ Benefits Fund). In 
2007 there were 89,476 governments in the United States. See Isabel Rodriguez-Tejado & John 
Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Crises, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, 
CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 9, 26 (Peter Conti-Brown 
& David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). 
25. See, e.g., State and Municipal Debt: The Coming Crisis?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
TARP, Fin. Servs., & Bailouts of Pub. & Private Programs, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, 112th Cong. 1–2 (2011), available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/01/gelinas_testimony_edit_2MH.pdf (testimony of Nicole Gelinas) (“But a state such 
as New York, for example, with one of the highest per-capita debt burdens in the nation, owes only 
$3.5 billion in ‘general obligation’ debt. New York owes the remainder of its $78.4 billion in debt 
through hundreds of special ‘authorities,’ including the Transitional Finance Authority, 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Dormitory Authority, and others. . . . [I]t is local 
governments, including cities, towns, and school districts, not the state governments, that owe the 
bulk of what people think of as ‘state’ pension benefits.”). 
26. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006) (“The term ‘municipality’ means political subdivision or public 
agency or instrumentality of a State.”). 
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states also agree to make the repayment of a municipality’s debt the 
“moral obligation” of the state, but such an obligation cannot subject the 
state to legal liability.27 
Corporate debt analysts must pay careful attention both to where the 
firm locates its assets, and where it earns its income. Both the state and 
its municipalities have some hard assets—such as vehicles, courthouses, 
schools, prisons, roads, bridges, and other infrastructure.28 Government 
entities may also have substantial financial assets, particularly 
municipalities in charge of government pensions.29 States and most 
municipalities have their own sources of income. Water districts and 
universities charge fees; cities, counties, and states assess taxes. 
Although states and municipalities may once have operated as fairly 
autonomous entities,30 the modern state government resembles a large 
firm. Money flows between the different levels (federal, state, local), and 
the levels work together to accomplish common goals such as providing 
education and other forms of public assistance. Corporate funds 
generally flow up, from the subsidiaries to the holding company. By 
contrast, government funds typically flow down. In 2010, federal grants-
in-aid to state and local governments were equal to about 37% of state 
and local government expenditures from their own sources.31 
                                                     
27. Rhonda Riherd Trautman, The Impact of State Debt Management on Debt Activity, PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN., June 1995, at 33, 34 (“Moral obligation refers to cases in which a state 
government has asserted the intent of the legislative body to make appropriations sufficient to make 
up for any deficiency in monies required to meet debt service for specified bonds. Any actual 
liability stops at this point in that the legislative body of the state has no legally enforceable 
obligation to pay off the bond.”). If sovereign immunity were absolute, there would be no difference 
between a moral obligation and a legal liability because creditors could not enforce these legal 
liabilities. As explained in Part II.A., however, sovereign immunity is not absolute.  
28. CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, supra note 3, at 28 (showing that the primary 
government of the state owns $109 billion in net capital assets (mostly state highway infrastructure), 
while the component units own $25.4 billion of the same (mostly buildings)). As more fully 
discussed below, most of these assets are exempt from seizure under state law. H.R. REP. NO. 100-
1011, at 4 (1988). 
29. See, e.g., CALPERS INVS., http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/investments/home.xml 
(last visited Aug. 4, 2012) (“[CalPERS is] the nation’s largest public pension fund with assets 
totaling $236.8 billion as of April 30, 2012 . . . .”). 
30. In 1902, state aid comprised just 6% of local general revenues, and federal aid comprised just 
1% of state and local general revenues. See DAVID R. BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE 
STATES: AUTONOMY, POLITICS, AND POLICY 160 app. A (2003). 
31. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 268 tbl.431 
(2012), [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES], available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/12statab/stlocgov.pdf (Federal Grants-in-Aid to State and 
Local Governments: 1990 to 2011); CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, supra note 3, at 36 
(showing that $67.849 billion of California’s $195.337 billion total 2011 revenue came from federal 
sources). 
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Intergovernmental revenue (from both the federal and state level) 
accounted for about 37% of local government’s general revenue.32 A 
state’s grants to its municipalities often comprise a very large share of its 
own budget. Grants to local governments account for about 30% of the 
average state’s spending,33 and they account for more than 65% of state 
expenditures in California and Ohio.34 Remember that bankruptcy 
defines “municipality” broadly to include non-local entities such as 
universities.35 Thus, these statistics understate the share of state spending 
that flows through municipalities. State laws also dictate terms of the 
contracts between a municipality and its workers. California mandates 
the pension terms for many local employees,36 and several states have 
laws that greatly affect teacher pay.37 
B. Debt Service Payments Do Not Account for a Large Share of State 
Budgets 
The classic justification for corporate bankruptcy is that it solves a 
collective action problem or “race to the assets.”38 Because non-
bankruptcy law generally grants priority to the creditor who wins the 
                                                     
32. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 292 tbl.455 (Local 
Governments—Revenue by State: 2008). 
33. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY 2 (2011), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/state/10statesummaryreport.pdf (“During 2010, 30.2% of state 
general expenditure was in the form of grants and aid to local governments (including independent 
school district governments), thereby underlining the states’ role as a financial resource for their 
subordinate governments.”).  
34. Chart F: Expenditures by Character, All Funds, CAL. DEPT. FINANCE, 
http://www.dof.ca.gov/budgeting/budget_faqs/documents/CHART-F.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2012) 
(California has budgeted about $165 billion in local assistance payments from all sources for the 
2012 to 2013 fiscal year out of a total budget of about $225 billion.); see also Tom Feran, State Rep. 
Ron Amstutz Says Most of the State Budget is Spent at the Local Level, POLITIFACT OHIO (June 22, 
2011, 6:00 a.m.), http://www.politifact.com/ohio/statements/2011/jun/22/ron-amstutz/state-rep-ron-
amstutz-says-most-state-budget-spent/ (“fact check” article indicating that 66.6% of Ohio’s all-
funds budget, and 85.6% of its general fund budget, is made up of local assistance).  
35. See supra note 14 and the accompanying text. 
36. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 50800-50927 (West 1983 & Supp. 2011) (authorizing local agencies 
with police and/or fire departments to establish pension funds having certain required terms); see 
also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-31-401 to -411 (West 2011) (governing statewide defined benefit 
plan for fire and police personnel hired after 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11:3001–3017 and 
§§ 11:3031–3053 (2006 & Supp. 2011) (providing terms for the retirement systems of the cities of 
Alexandria and Bogalusa, respectively). 
37. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 302A-624 (LexisNexis 2010) (teachers’ salary schedule); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.13(C) (LexisNexis 2009) (setting minimum salaries for teachers). 
38. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditor’s 
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) (arguing that bankruptcy can help solve a race to the assets by 
providing for pro rata distributions to general creditors and thus maximize collections for creditors). 
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race to the courthouse, each creditor is incentivized to try to collect 
immediately and in full even when forbearance could maximize 
aggregate recovery. Consider a simple example. Assume that the debtor 
owes $10 to each of ten creditors but can only pay $50 in the best-case 
scenario. Assume further that lawsuits or other collection efforts would 
destroy a substantial amount of value by causing the firm to liquidate 
immediately. If any creditor tries to collect individually, the debtor can 
pay a total of just $10. Although the creditors can maximize their 
collection if they each reduce their claims to $5, each will rationally try 
to collect in full immediately. If only one creditor tries to collect, then 
that creditor wins the race to the courthouse and is paid in full. If all of 
the other creditors try to collect, the creditor is again better off racing. If 
the creditor races, then he or she will win—i.e. receive payment in full—
10% of the time. If the creditor does not race, he or she will certainly 
lose. 
Scholars have adapted the collective action justification to municipal 
bankruptcy as well.39 Creditors cannot force the liquidation of a 
municipality, but a successful litigant may be able to force a 
municipality to impose additional taxes for the litigant’s benefit. If too 
many creditors sue to impose additional taxes, aggregate tax revenue can 
fall as business and individuals flee to other jurisdictions.40 
The explanation of bankruptcy as a solution to a collective action 
problem is far more powerful if the debtor owes a large amount to 
disorganized trade creditors who lack a non-bankruptcy coordination 
mechanism that could control this problem. Measured in absolute terms, 
some states do owe significant amounts to trade creditors. Illinois, for 
example, delayed payments to Medicare providers and other vendors 
during its recent financial troubles and owed approximately $5 billion of 
trade debt by March 2011.41 
                                                     
39. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual 
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425 (1993) (arguing that non-bankruptcy 
law causes individual creditors to seek special taxes beyond the point that maximizes aggregate tax 
revenue). 
40. Id. at 448 (“Unusually high rates of taxation also discourage economic activity and create an 
incentive for business and higher income taxpayers to depart the jurisdiction.”). 
41. See Paul Merrion et al., Illinois Enters a State of Insolvency, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Jan. 16, 
2010), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20100116/ISSUE01/100032910 (“A record $5.1 
billion in state bills was past due at yearend [sic], almost doubling to 92 days from 48 days a year 
earlier the average amount of time it takes the state to pay vendors such as doctors, hospitals, non-
profit service providers and other contractors.”). California has experienced similar problems. 
Daniel C. Vock, Nightmare Scenarios Haunt States, STATELINE (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/nightmare-scenarios-haunt-states-85899384506 
(“California’s controller in February put a rare 30-day hold on paying most state bills, including 
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However, states generally owe much more money to their 
bondholders than to trade creditors. For example, when Illinois owed $5 
billion of trade debt, it owed $35 billion to bondholders.42 Most of this 
debt took the form of general obligation bonds ($28 billion) or short-
term certificates ($1 billion to $2 billion). These obligations were backed 
by the “full faith and credit” of the State and resembled unsecured bonds 
issued by firms.43 
Some states have constitutional provisions that grant bondholders 
special priority. For example, the California Constitution requires that 
the State pay its bondholders before spending money on anything other 
than education.44 Other states provide even stronger protection, not even 
exempting education from the bondholders’ priority.45 Unlike large 
firms, states do not typically issue significant amounts of secured debt.46 
However, they do issue something very similar: revenue bonds. These 
bonds promise the holder priority with respect to a specific revenue 
stream (typically a tax).47 In March 2011, Illinois had about $5.4 billion 
in revenue bonds outstanding. The State sales tax backed the majority of 
those bonds, but some were backed by a hotel tax or other revenue.48 
Other states are less reliant on general obligations. In 2004, states owed 
about $754 billion of long-term debt (in 2010, they owed about $1.1 
trillion),49 but only $209 billion of the 2004 debt was backed by the full 
faith and credit of the states.50 
Bonds are issued pursuant to contracts called indentures, and states 
could prevent a collective action problem among bondholders by issuing 
                                                     
personal income tax returns, to guarantee there would be enough cash in the bank to pay schools 
and bondholders.”). 
42. STATE OF ILL., GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS, TAXABLE SERIES OF FEBRUARY 2011, at 37, 
44 (2011), available at http://emma.msrb.org/EP504139-EP393014-EP790226.pdf. 
43. Id. at 36–37.  
44. CAL. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 1, 8. 
45. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 12. 
46. H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988). 
47. Like secured debt, these bonds can be recourse or non-recourse. Revenue bonds receive 
stronger protection in Chapter 9 than secured debt receives in other bankruptcy chapters. In 
particular, revenue bonds retain their priority with respect to revenue received after the bankruptcy 
filing, 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2006), while secured debt only receives priority with respect to after-
acquired assets if they are proceeds of other secured assets, id. § 552. 
48. STATE OF ILL., supra note 42, at 44–45.  
49. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF STATE GOVERNMENT FINANCES (2010), 
available at http://www.census.gov/govs/state/1000usst.html. 
50. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 31, at 286 tbl.449 (State 
Governments—Summary of Finances: 1990 to 2007). 2004 is the last year for which the Census 
Bureau reports the amount of state debt that is backed by the full faith and credit of the state. 
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all of their debt pursuant to a single indenture and allowing the majority 
of bondholders to amend the indenture. However, states do not typically 
do this. Instead they usually have multiple bond series outstanding, each 
with its own separate indenture.51 These indentures may allow the 
majority to amend some terms, but most insist that a single creditor have 
the right to sue to enforce a missed payment and require unanimous 
approval to modify payment terms.52 
Although state debts are large in absolute terms, the cost of servicing 
this debt is small relative to the state’s revenues and expenses. The 
complete elimination of a state’s capital market debt would only 
modestly effect the state’s cash flow. For example, in 2011, California’s 
debt service payments equaled just 5.3% of its general fund revenues.53 
Nationally, interest payments generally account for 4 to 7% of state and 
local budgets. Many states and municipalities can only incur debt for 
capital investment,54 and the primary state programs (education, social 
assistance, and corrections) are not very capital intensive.55 
C. Pension Obligations Constitute a Substantial Burden on States 
States may be unable to sustain current or planned spending without 
raising taxes or cutting other spending, but taxing and spending are 
political, not legal, questions. Those questions become legal only when a 
state decides to cut spending by breaking its obligations. Defaulting on 
the promises that states have made to capital markets would not sharply 
                                                     
51. See, e.g., Amended and Restated 2003A Bond Indenture, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/efficiency/revenuebonds/official_documents/2003A_Bond_Indenture_ex
ecution_copy.pdf; 2005A Bond Indenture, CAL. ENERGY COMMISSION, http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
efficiency/revenuebonds/official_documents/2005A_Bond_Indenture_v11_execution_copy.pdf. 
52. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 330 (“Relatively few state bond issues currently include CACs 
or their equivalent.”). The Trust Indenture Act insists that an individual bondholder have the right to 
sue when it is not paid, but state bonds are not subject to the Trust Indenture Act. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77ddd(a)(4)(A) (2006). 
53. CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, supra note 3, at 36. 
54. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 8 (1988). For a more general discussion of the limitations placed on 
the issuance of debt by state and local governments, see Rodriguez-Tejado & Wallis, supra note 24, 
at 19–31. 
55. In 2011, California devoted 87% of its general fund to such programs—46% to education, 
31% to health and human services, and 10% to corrections. CAL. STATE CONTROLLER’S OFFICE, 
supra note 3, at 18. If we look at government-wide expenditures, these programs still account for 
82% of spending. Id. at 13. Nationally, education and welfare expenditures alone accounted for 
about 65% of state spending in 2010. See State Government Finances Summary, supra note 33, at 
10 app. tbl.A-2 (General Expenditures and Education Expenditures of State Governments With U.S. 
Summary: 2010 and 2009). Highway expenditures (a capital-intensive undertaking) accounted for 
just 7% of spending. Id. at 14. 
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reduce spending, but the financial commitments that states have made to 
current and past workers may be more significant. Government 
employers are not subject to the National Labor Relations Act,56 so state 
law governs the rights of state workers, with most states giving at least 
some employees collective bargaining rights.57 During fiscal crises, 
states and municipalities will sometimes resort to unpaid furloughs or 
otherwise fail to comply with the terms of their collective bargaining 
agreements.58 
Pensions and other long-term benefits comprise a significant portion 
of the compensation of state workers and state pensions, and state 
pensions exceeded $3 trillion in 2010.59 Some of these pensions may not 
be owed by the states themselves; government pension statistics make it 
difficult to separate how much is owed by the states and how much is 
owed by their municipalities.60 On the other hand, government 
accounting rules allow states to discount future pension obligations at 
the rate that they expect to earn on their investments (rather than the 
much lower rate that reflects the risk that those obligations will not be 
paid).61 This method violates basic principles of finance, and the 
inappropriately low discount rate understates the true value of the 
pension obligations by trillions of dollars.62 As long as the Census 
Bureau estimate is remotely accurate, the amount owed to current and 
former workers is many times larger than the amount of bonds backed 
by the full faith and credit of the states.63 States typically set aside assets 
                                                     
56. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
57. See Befort, supra note 7, at 17 (“Approximately 80% of the states have adopted statutes 
authorizing collective bargaining for at least some groups of public employees.”).  
58. See id. at 10 (“Governmental employers have resorted to layoffs, hiring freezes, wage freezes, 
pay lags, and employee furloughs, among other options during periods of budgetary turmoil.”).  
59. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SUMMARY OF THE 2010 ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC-EMPLOYEE 
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: STATE-ADMINISTERED PENSIONS 7 app. tbl.A-1 (Jan. 2012), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/govs/retire/2010_summary_report.pdf. Non-pension liabilities may be 
large as well. For example, official estimates of Illinois’ five different pensions total roughly $125 
billion, and Illinois owes another $24 billion in other retirement benefits (mainly healthcare). 
Official Statement, General Obligation Bonds, Taxable Build America Bonds, Series 2010-2, STATE 
ILL. 48, 54 (Apr. 12, 2010), http://emma.msrb.org/EA382562-EA300739-EA696414.pdf. 
60. Enhancing the Analysis of U.S. State and Local Government Pension Obligations, FITCH 
RATINGS 3 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ncpers.org/Files/2011_enhancing_the_analysis_of_state_ 
local_government_pension_obligations.pdf. This difficulty is compounded by the fact that some 
states guarantee the benefits of these plans. Id. at 3–4. 
61. See Joshua D. Rauh & Robert Novy-Marx, Public Pension Promises: How Big Are They and 
What Are They Worth?, 66 J. FIN. 1207 (2010). 
62. Id. 
63. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
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in special accounts to fund pension obligations, but the amount set aside 
is often much less than the obligations. In 2008, twenty-one states had 
funded less than 80% of their pension obligations, and only two states 
had funded at least half of their health care and other non-pension 
benefits.64 
Both the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(“ERISA”)65 and provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that penalize 
reductions in pension benefits66 exempt state and municipal pensions 
from their coverage. As a result, states may be able to alter state and 
municipal pensions by amending state law. State law treatment of public 
pensions varies widely.67 Two states retain the traditional view that 
public pensions are mere gratuities that can be freely changed by a 
state.68 Most states limit the ability of the government to change the 
terms of a pension in a way that is unfavorable to the employee. One 
state uses a promissory estoppel theory,69 and many others use a contract 
theory.70 As a result, state laws that modify these obligations could raise 
Contract Clause issues.71 A few states view pensions as property 
interests,72 and laws altering these pensions could raise due process or 
takings concerns. Finally, a number of states have constitutional 
provisions that protect pension obligations.73 While state constitutions 
are much easier to amend than the federal constitution, doing so still 
requires substantial political will. 
This Part used an analogy to corporate finance to explain the finances 
of a state, but David Skeel argues that “the relevant analogy is not 
corporate bankruptcy so much as personal bankruptcy.”74 In contrast to 
                                                     
64. While Illinois’ is the most underfunded state pension system in the country, as of 2008, the 
pension systems of seven other states—Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island and West Virginia—were underfunded by more than one-third. THE PEW CTR. ON THE 
STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNDERFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND THE 
ROAD TO REFORM 3 (2010), available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010 
/Trillion_Dollar_Gap_Underfunded_State_Retirement_Systems_and_the_Roads_to_Reform.pdf. 
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2000). 
66. I.R.C. §§ 411(d)(6), 411(e)(1)(A) (2006). 
67. For a review of these laws, see Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan Reform, 5 EDUC. FIN. 
& POL. 617 (2010). 
68. See Ballard v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of Evansville, 324 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ind. 
1975); Kunin v. Feofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 63 (5th Cir. 1995) (Texas). 
69. Christensen v. Minneapolis Mun. Emps. Ret. Bd., 331 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Minn. 1983). 
70. See Monahan, supra note 67. 
71. See infra Part II.B. 
72. See Monahan, supra note 67. 
73. Id. 
74. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 683. Others have made similar claims. See, e.g., Robert K. 
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corporate bankruptcy, in individual bankruptcy the decision maker 
cannot be replaced, and bankruptcy serves to adjust an unsustainable 
debt load.75 The same may be true of state bankruptcy; Congress may 
not allow creditors to wrest control of the political process from the 
voters.76 As explained in the next Part, the analogy between the 
sovereign and the individual is useful for another reason. Poverty and 
generous non-bankruptcy protections can render many individuals 
relatively immune from judgment, making bankruptcy unnecessary.77 
Similarly, sovereign immunity and a flexible interpretation of the 
Contract Clause may make most state obligations legally unenforceable 
and render the need for bankruptcy unclear. 
II. NON-BANKRUPTCY LAW MAY PREVENT THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF STATE OBLIGATIONS 
Today many debtors use federal bankruptcy to resolve their financial 
distress, but that has not always been the case. In fact, Americans did not 
file any federal bankruptcy petitions during most of the nineteenth 
century. Debtors defaulted on their debts, sometimes at rates that rivaled 
those of today,78 but the United States had no federal bankruptcy code 
under which a debtor could file.79 Similarly, states may be able to 
resolve their financial distress without the need of the federal bankruptcy 
                                                     
Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1159 (2004). 
75. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 683.  
76. See infra notes 230–56 and the accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy?, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121 (2004). 
78. According to some estimates, the rate at which Americans were sent to debtor’s prison around 
1833 was roughly equivalent to the rate at which Americans file for consumer bankruptcy today. 
See CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 52 n.8 (1935) (“As late as 1833, 
however, it was estimated that 75,000 persons were annually sent to jail for debt . . . .”). The United 
States population was approximately 14,162,000 in 1833, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at A6-8 (1975), available at 
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p1-01.pdf, yielding a rate of about one 
imprisonment for every 200 Americans. In 2010, American consumers filed 1,536,799 non-business 
bankruptcy petitions, Bankruptcy Statistics, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 6, 2012), and the 
United States population was 308,745,538, id. This also yields a rate of about one bankruptcy filing 
for every 200 Americans.  
79. Prior to 1898, Congress enacted three bankruptcy acts that together lasted less than twenty 
years. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 
248; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 
614. For a history of bankruptcy in the United States, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: 
A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2001); Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of 
Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5 (1995).  
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code. Federal bankruptcy may be a useful tool for resolving financial 
distress, but Congress should ensure that its advantages are relevant for 
insolvent states before amending the bankruptcy code to allow them to 
file. 
Standard justifications for federal bankruptcy assume that non-
bankruptcy law provides creditors with powerful remedies or at least 
allows them to exert substantial pressure beyond the ability to refuse to 
extend future credit or report the default to others. If the debtor is an 
individual, creditors can seize assets and garnish wages.80 Even when 
non-bankruptcy law limits legal remedies, creditors can rely on non-
judicial measures such as dunning letters and telephone calls that take a 
psychological toll. If the debt burden is too great, individuals may not 
make profitable investments or work hard because any amount earned 
will accrue to their creditors’ benefit. The bankruptcy code, therefore, 
shields individuals from collection efforts and offers a fresh start that 
reduces the amount that an individual must pay.81 If the debtor is a firm, 
senior creditors may liquidate the firm even if it has value as a going 
concern, and non-bankruptcy law’s priority system can cause a 
destructive race to the assets or prevent the debtor from accessing new 
capital.82 Bankruptcy, therefore, offers firms a chance to reorganize their 
debts or to liquidate in an orderly fashion.83 Courts do not liquidate 
municipalities, but non-bankruptcy law may allow the court to order the 
municipality to adopt special taxes and pay the proceeds to the creditors. 
If too many creditors seek this remedy, citizens will flee to another 
jurisdiction, aggregate tax receipts will fall, and creditors as a group will 
be worse off. Scholars, therefore, use this taxing power to invoke the 
                                                     
80. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Broke But Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State 
Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
81. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
1393, 1402 (1985). Individuals can file for bankruptcy under Chapters 7, 11, 13 or, if they are 
family farmers or fishermen, Chapter 12. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). Nearly all consumers choose 
Chapters 7 or 13. See Table F-2: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts––Business and Nonbusiness Cases 
Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 
30, 2011, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/0911_f2.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2012) (showing that 
99.1% of non-business filings were made in Chapters 7 or 13). Chapter 7 offers debtors a discharge 
in exchange for any non-exempt assets that they may have. See BARRY E. ADLER, DOUGLAS G. 
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, BANKRUPTCY 559–620 (4th ed. 2007). Chapter 13 offers debtors a 
discharge if they complete a repayment plan that usually lasts for three to five years. Id. at 620–63. 
82. See Jackson, supra note 38. 
83. Most firms can file under Chapter 7 (liquidation) or Chapter 11 (reorganization). See 11 
U.S.C. § 109. 
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race-to-the-assets story to justify municipal bankruptcy as well.84 
Traditional theories do not justify a bankruptcy system for sovereign 
states to the extent that states are (or can make themselves) judgment-
proof and relatively immune to pressure. This does not mean that 
sovereign debtors should always pay in full. Just as a debt overhang can 
justify a bankruptcy discharge for an individual, it can justify the 
reduction of sovereign debt.85 If the sovereign is truly judgment-proof, 
however, it does not need a legal mechanism to reduce its debt. It can 
just refuse to pay. 
The sovereign’s ability to renege on promises represents both power 
and weakness. Immunity represents power because the sovereign cannot 
be forced to pay or perform. Immunity also represents weakness because 
it reduces the sovereign’s ability to make promises it can credibly 
commit to keep. In theory, Congress could adopt a bankruptcy code that 
enhanced the credibility of a state’s promise by granting creditors 
remedies unavailable outside of bankruptcy and by allowing involuntary 
petitions. Such an approach is implausible, however, even in light of 
recent jurisprudence eroding state sovereign immunity in bankruptcy.86 
A judgment-proof sovereign may repay its debts to develop a 
reputation for honoring its commitments so that it can obtain more 
favorable terms from future trading partners.87 Even if reputation is the 
only deterrent to default, courts could still play a useful role by 
adjudicating the reasons for state defaults and helping states bolster their 
credibility. If there is a report of a state default, potential trading partners 
may find it very costly to determine whether the state has in fact 
breached its obligation and whether it did so opportunistically. A state 
may have a valid reason to refuse payment—a merchant may have 
                                                     
84. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 39. For a longer discussion of this argument, see supra 
notes 39–40 and the accompanying text. 
85. See Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. ECON. 253 (1988). 
A sovereign saddled with too much debt may fail to adopt policies that lead to future growth 
because the benefits will accrue to its creditors.  
86. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) (holding that sovereign immunity 
does not bar suits by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers). More generally, 
Congress has the ability to abrogate sovereign immunity both inside and outside of bankruptcy and 
thus could enhance the ability of creditors to sue and collect. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 178–89 (2d ed. 1988). I suggest that this move is implausible because 
proponents of a federal bankruptcy chapter for states seek mechanisms that would reduce rather 
than enhance the ability of creditors to collect from a state.  
87. See Ugo Panizza et al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. 
LIT. 651, 662–63 (2009); Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for 
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001 (IMF Working Paper WP/02/133, 2002), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf. 
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delivered defective goods, a contractor’s performance may be late, or the 
state may not have been responsible for a tort victim’s injuries. In other 
cases the state may mistakenly believe that it has a valid excuse and will 
promptly pay when shown its error. By allowing itself to be sued and 
complying with judgments entered against it, a state can demonstrate its 
willingness to fulfill its obligations and thereby obtain better terms from 
future trading partners.88 
While transparency and credibility may justify many suits against a 
state, it is less persuasive when applied to a default due to insolvency or 
a fiscal crisis. The relevant facts necessary to determine the state’s 
financial condition are likely to be widely disseminated in newspapers 
and therefore relatively inexpensive for the most significant potential 
trading partners to gather. Moreover, it is unlikely that future trading 
partners would rely on a court’s or even the current creditors’ judgment 
as to whether the state “should” have paid. Recent developments relating 
to a different type of sovereign debt provide a graphic example. Banks 
holding a substantial amount of Greek debt proposed a rollover in an 
effort to stave off a default under the terms of their contract, but the deal 
quickly evaporated when Standard & Poor’s declared that the plan 
would itself constitute a default for the purpose of Greece’s debt rating.89 
Existing creditors have the right to determine what constitutes a default 
for the purposes of their contracts, but they do not have the right to 
determine what constitutes a default for the purposes of the borrower’s 
credit reputation. If they did, the rating agency’s decision would have 
been a non-event.90 
If bankruptcy is to have a role, it must stop creditor enforcement 
efforts. We can roughly divide these collection efforts into legal and 
extra-legal sanctions. In the literature that discusses borrowing by 
sovereign nations, scholars suggest that creditors may sponsor trade 
sanctions or even convince their governments to engage in gunboat 
diplomacy.91 It is hard to imagine creditors leading a boycott of 
California wine or an invasion of Illinois, but states may be vulnerable to 
the extra-legal sanctions commonly used against private firms. Suppliers 
                                                     
88. States do in fact allow themselves to be sued. See David K. Miller & M. Stephen Turner, 
Enforcement of Money Judgments Against the State, 64 FLA. B. J. 29 (1990).  
89. Harry Wilson, Greek Debt Rollover Amounts to ‘Selective Default,’ TELEGRAPH (July 4, 2011, 
9:26 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/gilts/8616659/Greek-debt-rollover-
amounts-to-selective-default.html. 
90. Technically a credit rating agency does not have the final say in the determination of the 
debtor’s reputation. Future creditors are free to ignore a credit rating unless these ratings factor into 
risk-weighted capital calculations as they do for regulated investors like banks or pension funds. 
91. See Panizza, supra note 87, at 678–79.  
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who are not paid for deliveries may refuse further business, and workers 
who are not paid may strike or quit. 
The bankruptcy code clearly prohibits the use of extra-legal sanctions 
to collect debts,92 and courts can punish creditors who willfully ignore 
this prohibition.93 In practice, however, courts recognize that they are 
unable to thoroughly police this behavior, and this sometimes leads them 
to authorize deviations from ordinary priority rules. Workers and 
favored suppliers are frequently paid in full and in cash on the first day 
of Chapter 11 reorganization, while other holders of unsecured claims 
must wait until the end of the proceedings and receive pennies on the 
dollar.94 If a state wishes to punish the use of these extra-legal sanctions, 
it does not need the bankruptcy code to do so. For example, a state could 
pass a law prohibiting its workers from striking. These laws may prove 
no more effective than federal bankruptcy’s prohibition on extra-legal 
sanctions, and a state may simply give in to the threat of extra-legal 
sanctions or at least allow their exercise. 
Creditors who wish to use the courts to enforce their rights against a 
state face at least two major hurdles: sovereign immunity (including the 
Eleventh Amendment) and the courts’ flexible interpretation of the 
Contract Clause. Under existing interpretations of sovereign immunity 
and the Eleventh Amendment, a state can probably prevent its most 
significant creditors from suing to collect in either state or federal court. 
However, a state may be unable to retract a waiver of its sovereign 
immunity, and creditors may even be able to enforce some covenants. In 
addition, the Eleventh Amendment will not stop suits brought against a 
state’s localities. Because states use these localities to accomplish many 
of their goals, these suits could put substantial pressure on state budgets. 
Bringing suit is, however, only the first step in the process. States may 
pass laws designed to thwart the creditors’ claims, and the validity of 
these laws would turn on the court’s interpretation of the Contract 
Clause. Some courts have used the flexible interpretation mandated by 
the Supreme Court to adopt standards that are similar to those that would 
be used in bankruptcy. 
A. Sovereign Immunity May Prevent Creditors from Suing a State 
The Revolutionary War left many of the new states heavily in debt, 
and creditors sought to use the courts to force them to pay. Creditors 
                                                     
92. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2006). 
93. Id. § 362(k).  
94. See ADLER, BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 81, at 445.  
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found state courts to be hostile venues, and so they turned to the new 
federal courts. In Chisholm v. Georgia,95 the Supreme Court ruled that 
federal courts had jurisdiction to hear suits brought against a state by 
creditors from another state.96 The reaction to Chisholm was swift. 
Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment within weeks of the entry 
of the final judgment in Chisholm, and state approval followed about a 
year later.97 The Eleventh Amendment states “[t]he Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
State.”98 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment to 
prohibit federal courts from hearing suits against states even if the suit 
alleged unconstitutional action (e.g. a violation of the Contract Clause), 
and even if the party bringing the suit were a citizen of the state itself.99 
The Eleventh Amendment does not render a state completely immune 
from suit. Its sister states and the federal government can bring suit in 
federal court.100 When states defaulted on their bonds in the nineteenth 
century, creditors asked their own state governments to sue on their 
behalf and turn over any amounts collected. The Supreme Court ruled 
that one state could not sue another if it were acting as a mere pass-
through or collection agent for its citizens.101 Later, however, creditors 
donated their bonds to a state government, and the Supreme Court ruled 
that a creditor state could sue a debtor state for its own account.102 If 
bondholders credibly threaten to sell or give their bonds to a state willing 
to sue the debtor state, they may be able to extract a settlement. This 
route would probably be unavailable to a state’s current and former 
                                                     
95. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
96. Id. at 480. 
97. See Orth, supra note 6, at 428 n.41 (“Because of delays, judgment for Chisholm was not 
entered until February 14, 1794 . . . . By March 4, 1794, Congress by two-thirds majorities in both 
houses had proposed the amendment, and by February, 1795, the legislatures of three-fourths of the 
states had ratified it.”). 
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  
99. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). For a brief and accessible overview of the Eleventh 
Amendment, see MICHAEL COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 127–54 (2001). 
100. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904); TRIBE, supra note 86, at 175 
(“Suits brought by sister states or by the United States are thus not prohibited.”). 
101. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (“[O]ne State cannot create a 
controversy with another State . . . by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other State to 
its citizens.”); Orth, supra note 6, at 437. 
102. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 321 (1904); Orth, supra note 6, at 451–53. 
However, foreign governments cannot sue a state. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 
313, 330 (1934). 
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workers even if a willing creditor state could be found. ERISA, and its 
prohibition of the assignment of benefits, does not apply to state 
pensions.103 However, the Internal Revenue Code restricts favorable tax 
treatment to pensions that insist that any assignment be voluntary, 
revocable, and worth less than 10% of any benefit payment made.104 
A more common strategy for circumventing the Eleventh Amendment 
is to sue an officer of the state rather than the state itself. If the officer is 
not acting pursuant to a valid state law (and the federal Constitution can 
render a state law invalid), then that officer is no longer cloaked with the 
mantle of the state and federal courts can enjoin the officer from 
violating the plaintiff’s rights.105 In 1875, creditors used this strategy to 
prevent Louisiana from issuing additional bonds on terms that would 
have violated promises made to existing bondholders.106 However, eight 
years later the Supreme Court rejected an attempt to use mandamus to 
force Louisiana to resume interest payments at the contractual rate.107 
The Supreme Court has subsequently said that “when the action is in 
essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the 
real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke its sovereign 
immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal 
defendants.”108 As a result, contract claimants can’t use this technique to 
recover damages for breach. 
The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent creditors from suing in 
state court, but creditors sought access to federal court because they 
found the state courts to be inhospitable. If a creditor sues a state in its 
own courts, the state can invoke sovereign immunity or take other steps 
                                                     
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2006). 
104. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (2006). 
105. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
106. Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875). The bonds at issue in McComb 
were themselves the product of a work-out agreement whereby creditors agreed to exchange old 
debt for new bonds at sixty cents on the dollar. Id. at 534. A district court used a similar strategy to 
prevent Arkansas from diverting funds that had been pledged to specific bonds. See Hubbell v. 
Leonard, 6 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. Ark. 1934). However, constitutional law scholars question whether 
modern courts would still reach this result in light of subsequent rulings that find immunity when 
equitable relief would impact the state treasury. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, What States Can 
Learn from Municipal Insolvency, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND 
SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 99, 112–13 (Peter Conti-Brown & David 
A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012). 
107. Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 728 (1883).  
108. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); see also Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“[T]he rule has evolved that a suit by private parties seeking to 
impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment.”). 
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(change evidentiary rules, etc.) to make the process difficult.109 Creditors 
could try to sue a state in the courts of a sister state, but this raises the 
difficult issue of whether the court must and can obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the state.110 Even if successful, the creditor would need 
to find assets to attach. Most state assets (schools, roads government 
buildings, etc.) are exempt from attachment,111 and many of the financial 
assets (cash, securities, etc.) of a state will actually belong to its 
municipalities (retirement funds, etc.). A state can also protect itself by 
keeping its assets out of jurisdictions where creditors can sue.112 
States can, and sometimes do, waive sovereign immunity in their 
contracts,113 and there is some chance that these waivers would be 
enforced. Language in a nineteenth century Supreme Court opinion 
suggests that a state could retract such a waiver: “although the state may, 
at the inception of the contract, have consented as one of its conditions 
to subject itself to suit, it may subsequently withdraw that consent, and 
resume its original immunity, without any violation of the obligation of 
its contract in the constitutional sense.”114 However, at least one 
constitutional scholar has seized on some recent Supreme Court 
language115 to argue that a state cannot retract a contractual waiver.116 
                                                     
109. See Orth, supra note 6, at 439–47. 
110. One could argue for personal jurisdiction in a state where a debtor-state marketed its bonds. 
However, this strategy may be difficult if the debt at issue is owed to current or former workers. 
111. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1011, at 4 (1988). 
112. The experience of defaulting nations suggests that creditors will sometimes find assets to 
attach. The immunity enjoyed by sovereign nations is quite different than that enjoyed by the states. 
Most notably, sovereign nations are not immune to the extent that they engage in commercial 
activity, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2006), and United States courts have held that issuing bonds to the 
market qualifies as commercial activity. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 5 U.S. 607 
(1992); Panizza, supra note 87, at 652–59. Although creditors can sue defaulting nations, these 
nations have been fairly adept at keeping their assets beyond the reach of the creditors. See, e.g., 
Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 977, 986 (2007) (“For example, over $740 million in judgments have been obtained 
against Argentina on account of its sovereign debt defaults in 2001. Argentina, however, keeps no 
funds in the U.S. for commercial purposes, and its deposits elsewhere, particularly in Switzerland, 
are immune from attachment.”). Creditors occasionally find bank accounts that they can attach. See, 
e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2012). 
113. Waivers of sovereign immunity in state court are far more common than waivers of the 
Eleventh Amendment. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 334 (“[W]aivers [of the Eleventh 
Amendment] are relatively rare; states typically consent to suit only in their own courts.”). 
114. Ex parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). 
115. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999) 
(“[A] State may, absent any contractual commitment to the contrary, alter the conditions of its 
waiver and apply those changes to a pending suit.”). 
116. See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private 
Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 292–303 (2002). The possibility of 
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Moreover, states can effectively waive sovereign immunity by 
structuring contracts so that they must initiate the legal action. In the 
nineteenth century, for example, Virginia issued bonds that gave holders 
the option to apply the coupon toward their tax bills. When political 
power in the state shifted, Virginia took steps to prevent bondholders 
from tendering these coupons in payment of their debts.117 After several 
unsuccessful attempts, bondholders finally found a strategy for recovery 
that worked. They could effectively recover by tendering the coupons in 
payment of their taxes and then bringing an action in detinue to recover 
any property taken by the tax collector.118 
Sovereign immunity does not protect local government entities such 
as cities or counties, but it does protect the state, its agencies, and other 
arms.119 Even where a public entity constitutes a “political subdivision or 
public agency or instrumentality of a State” and therefore a municipality 
under the bankruptcy code,120 it may still be immune from some suits.121 
Consistent with the theory that judgment-proof entities do not need 
federal bankruptcy protection, it does not appear that any of the 
municipalities that have ever filed for federal bankruptcy could have 
claimed sovereign immunity.122 On the other hand, a large share of state 
spending flows through localities,123 and if creditors can enforce their 
rights against these localities, they can substantially increase the cost 
that a state must incur to accomplish its goals. Because of this, and 
because of the other limits on sovereign immunity, it is worth 
considering plaintiffs’ ability to enforce their claims once they get into 
court. 
                                                     
waiving sovereign immunity contrasts with the general inability of entities to waive their right to 
file for bankruptcy. 
117. See Orth, supra note 6, at 439–47. 
118. Id. 
119. See Collins, supra note 99, at 127 (“Sovereign immunity protects only the state, state 
agencies, and other arms of the state. Historically, it has not protected cities, counties, and other 
local government entities.”); Orth, supra note 6, at 438–39. 
120. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (2006). 
121. See, e.g., Leach v. Tex. Tech Univ., 335 S.W.3d 386 (Tex. App. 2011). 
122. Lists of governments that have filed for bankruptcy can be found in Keren H. Deal, An 
Examination of Municipal Finance Reform Regarding Municipal Bankruptcies in the United States 
313–17 app. II (Aug. 4, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University) (on file with 
author) (listing all Chapter 9 filings between 1971 and 2005), and George H. Hempel, An 
Evaluation of Municipal “Bankruptcy” Laws and Procedures, 28 J. FIN. 1339, 1342–43 (1973) 
(listing filings between 1938 and 1971). A thorough analysis of whether these entities could have 
claimed sovereign immunity is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the names of nearly all of 
these entities suggest a local character.  
123. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.  
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B. State Laws Amending Creditor Rights May Survive a Contract 
Clause Challenge 
“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts.”124 Despite the Constitution’s absolutist language, the 
Supreme Court has held that the Contract Clause does not prohibit 
legislation impairing private contracts if the legislation is a proper 
exercise of a state’s police powers. In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. 
Blaisdell,125 the Supreme Court upheld a law designed to grant mortgage 
debtors some relief from their creditors, reasoning that “[the] question is 
not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or 
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a 
legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to 
that end.”126 
The framers included the Contract Clause to prevent laws that 
interfered with the enforcement of contracts between private citizens,127 
but by the early nineteenth century the Supreme Court had applied the 
Contract Clause to invalidate a state law that interfered with the state’s 
own contract.128 Modern Contract Clause doctrine suggests that courts 
should be less deferential toward a state legislature when the statute 
impairs contracts in which the state has some interest. In United States 
Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey,129 the Supreme Court struck down 
a New Jersey statute that impaired bondholders’ rights.130 The Court 
ruled that although some powers could not be bargained away, “the 
power [of a state] to enter into effective financial contracts cannot be 
questioned.”131 Still, the Supreme Court allowed some flexibility even 
with respect to financial contracts: “The Contract Clause is not an 
                                                     
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
125. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
126. Id. at 438. Initially the Supreme Court drew a distinction between laws that impaired a 
contract’s obligation and laws that modified the remedies provided for enforcement. However, the 
dividing line between remedy and obligation quickly became obscured, and courts focused on the 
“reasonableness” of the legislation. See TRIBE, supra note 86, at 615. This does not mean that the 
Contract Clause is irrelevant; even after Blaisdell the courts have struck down some laws because 
they interfere with private contracts. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 
(1978). 
127. See TRIBE, supra note 86, at 618 (“Particularly since the clause was not intended primarily 
to protect public contracts . . . .”). 
128. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).  
129. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). These bonds were issued by an entity created by an interstate compact 
between New York and New Jersey. Id. at 1. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. at 24. 
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absolute bar to subsequent modification of a State’s own financial 
obligations. As with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, 
an impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to 
serve an important public purpose.”132 The Supreme Court further 
suggested that courts should exert some scrutiny when the law in 
question affected the state’s own obligations: “complete deference to a 
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate 
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”133 
Courts are not often asked to rule on whether laws altering the rights 
of bondholders violate the Contract Clause,134 but courts have applied 
the Supreme Court’s test to unilateral modifications of collective 
bargaining agreements. State and local governments have suffered a 
string of financial crises, and they often respond by trying to reduce their 
labor costs. When these cost-cutting efforts include a unilateral change 
to a collective bargaining agreement, workers may sue, alleging that the 
new laws violate the Contract Clause. A recent article by Stephen Befort 
surveys the cases and concludes that the courts focus on six primary 
factors when applying the Supreme Court’s “reasonable and necessary” 
test: (i) the severity of the government’s fiscal emergency, (ii) the 
foreseeability of the economic problems that created the crisis, (iii) the 
severity of the impairment of the workers’ rights, (iv) the availability of 
alternative courses of action, (v) whether the impairment acts 
prospectively or retrospectively, and (vi) whether the financial pain is 
shared by similarly situated groups.135 
Whether to allow an obligor to reject or modify its obligations 
because of a fiscal emergency is a question commonly associated with 
bankruptcy,136 and so it is not surprising that the Contract Clause 
                                                     
132. Id. at 25. An impairment is not “reasonable” if the parties could foresee the changed 
circumstances that made the impairment necessary, and not “necessary” if there are less drastic 
alternatives available for safeguarding the public interest. Courts applying state law analogs to the 
Contract Clause often apply standards that mirror the federal test. See, e.g., Pierce Cnty. v. State, 
159 Wash. 2d 16, 28, 148 P.3d 1002, 1010 (2006) (“This court uses a three-part test to determine if 
there has been an impairment of a public contract: (1) does a contractual relationship exist, (2) does 
the legislation substantially impair the contractual relationship, and (3) if there is substantial 
impairment, is it reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public purpose.”). 
133. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 26. 
134. For a notable exception, see Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 
(1942) (upholding a state created composition mechanism for municipal debt). 
135. See Befort, supra note 7, at 40–46. 
136. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 1129 (2006). This power applies to collective bargaining agreements 
as well. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984). Congress responded to 
Bildisco by enacting a special section for collective bargaining agreements (section 1113), but this 
section does not apply in municipal bankruptcies. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2006). The bankruptcy code also 
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standards reflect basic bankruptcy principles. The Contract Clause 
principle that an impairment must be substantial or severe is analogous 
to the bankruptcy principle that creditors cannot block a plan of 
reorganization if they receive something with a value equal to their 
claim.137 The Contract Clause analysis asks whether the severity of the 
financial distress is sufficiently dire to justify the law and whether 
alternative courses of action exist; this is similar to the bankruptcy 
inquiry as to whether a plan is actually in the best interests of creditors 
or whether the debtor must promise to pay more. Asking whether the 
financial pain is shared among similarly situated groups (Contract 
Clause) is effectively the same as asking whether a plan “discriminate[s] 
unfairly” against a particular group of creditors (bankruptcy).138 Whether 
the financial distress was foreseeable is less obviously relevant in the 
bankruptcy context, but courts have dismissed filings as lacking good 
faith when they believed that the agreement effectively constituted a 
settlement designed to resolve the insolvency.139 The contractual 
doctrine of mitigation allows a reconciliation of bankruptcy’s approach 
with the question of whether the modification acts prospectively or 
retrospectively. If a debtor rejects an executory contract (material 
performance remaining on each side), the counter-party will receive a 
claim for damages, but these damages are reduced to the extent that the 
rejection allows the counter-party to offer performance elsewhere. 
The standards applied in both the Contract Clause and federal 
bankruptcy contexts are sufficiently vague that it is possible that most 
sets of facts that would satisfy one standard would satisfy the other. But 
this does not mean that the court would necessarily apply the same 
analysis in each context. The norm of equitable treatment of creditors 
may be stronger in bankruptcy, meaning that the Contract Clause 
analysis would provide the state with greater flexibility. In his survey, 
Befort suggests that non-bankruptcy courts are too willing to approve a 
                                                     
requires that a municipality’s plan of reorganization comply with state law, and so courts have 
struggled when applying Bildisco when a municipality files. For example, courts consistently rule 
that Bildisco, and not state law, governs the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement, Orange 
Cnty. Emps. Ass’n v. Cnty. of Orange (In re Orange Cnty.), 179 B.R. 177, 183 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1995); In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009), but consider state law in 
determining the equities of the rejection or modification. In re Orange Cnty., 179 B.R. at 184 (“In 
Chapter 9, Bildisco does not excuse attempts by the County to comply with the requirements of 
California law.”). This difficult issue would, however, not arise in a state bankruptcy if the state 
simultaneously changed the relevant laws. 
137. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(II) (2006). 
138. Id. § 1129(b)(1).  
139. See, e.g., In re Colonial Ford, Inc., 24 B.R. 1014 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). 
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plan modifying workers’ rights, despite the plan not requiring other 
creditors to sacrifice as well.140 
III. AN INSOLVENT STATE COULD USE BANKRUPTCY 
UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Part II explains that states have used non-bankruptcy law to resolve 
past fiscal crises. In many instances, the states used the political process 
to raise taxes141 or cut spending. In the nineteenth century, several states 
cut spending by defaulting on their bond obligations. However, 
sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment largely prevented 
creditors from suing to enforce their claims against the states.142 More 
recently, states responded to fiscal crises by unilaterally amending 
their—or their municipalities’—collective bargaining agreements. 
Courts resolved these disputes by deciding whether the new state laws 
violated the Contract Clause.143 
Part III argues that although states cannot file for federal bankruptcy 
under existing law, a state could still use bankruptcy to address its fiscal 
woes. Section A argues that a state could use the federal bankruptcy 
code to sharply reduce its expenses. Much of a state’s spending flows 
through its municipalities. If a state can use bankruptcy to reduce its 
municipalities’ obligations, it can reduce the cost of achieving its goals. 
Section B suggests that an insolvent state could construct a synthetic 
bankruptcy process to resolve its own insolvency without using the 
federal bankruptcy code. 
A. States Can Use Municipal Bankruptcy to Reduce Expenses 
Some commentators have noted that much of the state debt reported 
in the news is not really state debt at all, but is instead owed by their 
municipalities.144 As a legal matter, they are correct. A state’s 
                                                     
140. See Befort, supra note 7, at 53–54 (“[C]ourts generally should not uphold a governmental 
entity’s modification of one of its own contracts unless it is part of a plan that distributes the burden 
of coping with fiscal crisis broadly and equitably.”). 
141. E.g., Illinois Lawmakers Pass 66 Percent Income Tax Increase, FOX NEWS (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/12/ill-lawmakers-pass-percent-income-tax-increase/ 
#ixzz1TQCYjw1w. 
142. See supra Part II.A. 
143. See supra Part II.B. 
144. See, e.g., Iris J. Lav & Elizabeth McNichol, Misunderstandings Regarding State Debt, 
Pensions, and Retiree Health Costs Create Unnecessary Alarm, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL. 
PRIORITIES, 8–9 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=3372; Steve Liesman, 
Why Muni Bond Crisis May Be Exaggerated, CNBC.COM (Feb. 15, 2011, 9:37 AM), 
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municipalities (cities, counties, universities, school districts, etc.) have 
their own bondholders, employees, and retirees. A state is not liable to 
such creditors unless it is a co-debtor or has issued a guarantee. While 
grouping state and municipal debt together may be incorrect as a strictly 
legal matter, so too is consolidating a large firm’s debt on the parent 
company’s balance sheet. Some of this debt will be owed by separate 
legal entities, and the parent company may not have guaranteed this 
debt. Generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) still insist that 
the parent report the debt of its subsidiaries on its own balance sheet if 
the parent owns more than half of the subsidiary.145 GAAP requires 
consolidation because the firm must pay these debts if it is to continue 
its current operations. Just as publicly traded corporations rely on their 
subsidiaries to conduct some business, states rely on their municipalities 
(universities, school districts, counties, cities, etc.) to accomplish some 
goals. Larger municipal obligations (bond debt, larger pensions, and 
collective bargaining agreements with higher salaries) mean that a state 
must transfer more money to its municipalities to ensure that the state’s 
streets are safe, its children are educated, and its poor receive health and 
financial assistance. Just as the debts of a corporation’s subsidiaries can 
reduce the money available to pay to shareholders as dividends, 
municipal debts can increase the taxes that a state’s citizens must pay. 
Thus, while municipal debts may not be state obligations as a legal 
matter, they are as a practical matter.146 
Because so much of a state’s spending flows through its 
municipalities,147 a state could materially reduce its costs by pushing 
these municipalities into bankruptcy. Clay Gillette has argued that a state 
cannot force one of its municipalities into bankruptcy.148 However, this 
depends on state law. The bankruptcy code insists that a municipality 
                                                     
http://www.cnbc.com/id/41584517/Why_Muni_Bond_Crisis_May_Be_Exaggerated. 
145. Consolidation of All Majority-Owned Subsidiaries, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 94, ¶¶ 1, 2, 13 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Oct. 1987). 
146. In the nineteenth century Alabama tried a different approach to reduce municipal debt, first 
dissolving the City of Mobile and then incorporating the Port of Mobile in its place. See Gillette, 
supra note 106, at 109. This attempt failed when the Supreme Court ruled that the Port of Mobile 
was the legal successor of the City of Mobile and was therefore liable for the debts. See Port of 
Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 300 (1886). 
147. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
148. See Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 299 (2011). Gillette further notes that states may not want their 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy because the automatic stay could lessen the ability of the state 
to seize control. Id. My argument posits that the state has seized control of the municipality prior to 
the bankruptcy filing. 
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file voluntarily,149 and “desire[] to effect a plan [of reorganization].”150 If 
a state’s plenary power allows the state to seize control of a 
municipality, the state could file on behalf of the municipality and effect 
a plan. We may soon find out whether this strategy will work. The State 
of Michigan recently enacted a statute granting itself the authority to 
appoint a manager with broad authority over a municipality’s finances 
where the State deems the municipality to be in financial distress.151 This 
authority includes the power to reject labor contracts, seize control of 
pensions, file a bankruptcy petition (with the consent of the governor), 
and control the bankruptcy process.152 This law faced substantial 
opposition from labor unions and other groups, and some citizens have 
sued claiming that it violates Michigan’s constitution.153 If this statute is 
a valid exercise of Michigan’s plenary powers, nothing in the federal 
bankruptcy code would prevent Michigan from pushing one of its 
municipalities into bankruptcy.154 
If a state were to force its municipalities into bankruptcy to resolve its 
own insolvency, many of the municipal bankruptcies would present 
similar issues. For example, a state may wish to use bankruptcy to adjust 
the pensions promised to former teachers from each school district and 
professors from each state university. A state would incur lower 
transactions costs and ensure greater consistency in the resolution of the 
issues if it could consolidate the bankruptcies of its municipalities in a 
single court, just as businesses consolidate the bankruptcies of their 
subsidiaries in a single court.155 Existing law may not allow the 
administrative consolidation of the bankruptcies of municipalities even if 
each were controlled by the state. A debtor may file for bankruptcy in a 
                                                     
149. 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2006) (making § 301 (voluntary filing) applicable in Chapter 9 but 
excluding § 303 (involuntary filing)). 
150. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(4). 
151. See 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 4; Caitlin Devitt, Michigan Bills to Rein in Local Government, 
BOND BUYER (Mar. 10, 2011),  
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_47/michigan_state_fiscal_law-1024198-1.html.  
152. See 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 4 § 19, 23. 
153. SUGAR LAW CTR., http://www.sugarlaw.org/democracy-emergency/ (last visited Aug. 19, 
2012).  
154. A municipality must also have specific authorization to file, fail to pay, or be unable to pay 
its debts as they come due and meet one of four tests designed to encourage pre-bankruptcy 
negotiation between the municipality and its creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 109, 101(32(C)). If a state can 
seize control of a municipality and act on its behalf, it can ensure that each of these tests is met.  
155. See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS 
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 34–37 (2005) (alleging that large firms abuse this right to 
strategically choose their bankruptcy venue). 
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district in which an affiliate has filed,156 and a court may 
administratively consolidate the two cases.157 The term “affiliate” does 
not currently contemplate two municipalities of the same state,158 but 
Congress could amend the definition so that it does. 
B. States Can Create Synthetic Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Without the 
Code 
Part IV discusses existing proposals for a new federal bankruptcy 
chapter for states, but there seems to be little political desire to amend 
the bankruptcy code to allow a state to file.159 This may change if the 
financial condition of one or more of the states materially worsens; 
during the nineteenth century Congress enacted a series of bankruptcy 
acts during financial crises only to repeal them when economic 
conditions improved.160 Even if Congress does not amend the code to 
allow a state to file, however, courts could use existing law to synthesize 
a bankruptcy mechanism (a single proceeding that binds all of a debtor’s 
creditors).161 This section explores that option. 
The most direct method of replicating a federal bankruptcy chapter 
for states would be for a state to create its own composition 
mechanism.162 There is some historical precedent for this. Congress first 
enacted a municipal bankruptcy procedure in 1934,163 but New Jersey 
already had a composition mechanism for its municipalities.164 New 
Jersey’s composition mechanism loosely resembled modern municipal 
bankruptcy. A municipality could adjust the rights of dissenting creditors 
if it received the support of a super-majority vote of creditors and if it 
                                                     
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006).  
157. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015. 
158. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (defining “affiliate” as a parent, subsidiary, substantial shareholder, 
etc.). 
159. As noted above, the nation’s governors almost uniformly oppose a state bankruptcy 
mechanism. See NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, supra note 2. 
160. See SKEEL, supra note 79, at 24–25.  
161. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
162. George Triantis also notes that a state could make its own composition mechanism. See 
Triantis, supra note 20.  
163. Bankruptcy Act of 1934, 11 U.S.C. § 80(k) (1937) (repealed 1978). In 1936 the Supreme 
Court found this law to be unconstitutional, Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 
1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936), and Congress quickly enacted a revised version in 1937. Bankruptcy Act of 
1937, § 83(i), former 11 U.S.C. § 403(i) (1940). For the legislative history of municipal bankruptcy, 
see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 903.LH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2011) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY]. 
164. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:27-1 to -66 (West 2012). 
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could convince a judge that the adjustments satisfied basic fairness 
tests.165 The precise details of New Jersey’s or other states’ composition 
mechanisms are unimportant. What is important is that a composition 
mechanism fits the broad definition of bankruptcy—a single proceeding 
that binds all creditors or at least those creditors over whom the court 
can obtain jurisdiction.166 
If a state created a mechanism to adjust its own debts, creditors could 
mount two challenges, but neither is likely to succeed. First, creditors 
could argue that federal law preempts a state composition mechanism. 
Today, section 903 of the bankruptcy code would expressly preempt 
New Jersey’s composition mechanism for its municipalities.167 However, 
the bankruptcy code does not prohibit a state mechanism that adjusts its 
own debt. Creditors could construct an argument based on implied 
preemption—either field preemption or conflict preemption. An 
argument based on field preemption would claim that Congress intended 
that federal bankruptcy law occupy the entire field of state insolvency.168 
An argument based on conflict preemption would claim that 
“compliance with both state law and federal law is impossible” or “state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”169 These arguments are 
unpersuasive. Given that Congress chose to enact a bankruptcy chapter 
for municipalities, expressly preempted state municipal bankruptcy 
mechanisms, and chose to remain silent with respect to state insolvency 
mechanisms, the better reading of the bankruptcy code is that Congress 
decided not to address the field of state insolvency at all. Because 
federal laws governing the rights of bondholders, workers, and retirees 
expressly exclude obligations owed by states,170 a state composition 
mechanism adjusting the rights of these creditors would not conflict with 
federal law. 
                                                     
165. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 504–05 (1942) 
(describing the New Jersey mechanism). Unlike New Jersey’s composition mechanism, modern 
Chapter 9 would allow a court to approve a plan over the objection of a class of creditors. See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 901, 943 (2006). However, this cramdown power is rarely, if ever, used. See Schwarcz, 
supra note 2, at 335 n.74 (“There does not appear to be any precedent in which municipalities 
resorted to cramdown under Chapter 9 . . . .”). 
166. As discussed below, this synthetic mechanism is not truly a bankruptcy mechanism precisely 
because it would be unable to bind all creditors. See infra notes 257–62 and the accompanying text.  
167. 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (2006) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of [a] municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such 
composition.”). 
168. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). 
169. Id. at 100–01. 
170. See supra notes 56, 65–66 and accompanying text.  
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Second, creditors could claim that a composition mechanism that 
applied retroactively would violate the Contract Clause.171 This 
objection would also likely fail, however. In Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. 
City of Asbury Park,172 the Supreme Court upheld New Jersey’s 
composition mechanism for pre-existing municipal debt against a 
Contract Clause challenge, reasoning that the law did not impair the 
creditors’ rights because the creditors received more than they would 
have had they pursued their largely unenforceable claims individually.173 
Creditors could argue that the Court must overturn Faitoute in light of 
United States Trust Co. of New York.174 However, a court applying the 
“reasonable and necessary” test of United States Trust Co. would still 
uphold a well-structured composition mechanism if economic 
circumstances were sufficiently dire. As noted above, the standards that 
a federal bankruptcy court would apply to a reorganization plan are 
similar to, and probably more stringent than, those used by courts in a 
Contract Clause analysis.175 
States did not create composition mechanisms when they defaulted on 
their obligations in the nineteenth century; they simply changed their 
laws to modify the rights of their creditors. States may take the same 
approach in a future crisis, modifying collective bargaining agreements, 
adjusting the rights of pension holders and other creditors, and 
promising new lenders priority over any existing debts. State law 
governs the rights of a state’s creditors. These laws would achieve the 
same result as a confirmed plan of reorganization if they survived 
Contract Clause challenges. This piecemeal approach does not directly 
control creditor conflicts, but it is unclear how significant these conflicts 
would be given the extreme difficulty of suing a state and attaching its 
assets.176 
Moreover, creditors could mitigate these conflicts by employing 
                                                     
171. Creditors could also claim that the changes violate the state’s faith and credit pledge (a 
matter of state law), but courts generally apply a balancing standard here as well. See Triantis, supra 
note 20, at 246–49. 
172. 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
173. Id. at 516 (“To call a law so beneficent in its consequences on behalf of the creditor who, 
having had so much restored to him, now insists on standing on the paper rights that were merely 
paper before this resuscitating scheme, an impairment of the obligation of contract is indeed to 
make of the Constitution a code of lifeless forms instead of an enduring framework of government 
for a dynamic society.”). 
174. For a discussion of United States Trust Co. of New York, see supra notes 129–33 and 
accompanying text. 
175. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
176. See supra Part II.A. 
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aggregate litigation techniques such as mandatory class actions177 in 
order to prevent individual plaintiffs from pursuing their claims 
independently before or after the final adjudication of the mandatory 
class action.178 Although not as broad as the automatic stay, mandatory 
class certification provides a reasonably close substitute.179 Even if a 
court refuses to certify mandatory class actions,180 the aggressive use of 
quasi-class action techniques (the transfer of similar litigation to a single 
court) could yield the benefits of litigation in a single forum and prevent 
                                                     
177. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) allows the certification of a class if: (i) the class is so numerous that 
joinder is impractical, (ii) there are common questions of law or fact (does the new legislation 
satisfy the Contract Clause?), (iii) the claims of the representative party are typical of other class 
members (are they similarly affected by the legislation?), and (iv) “the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). A court can certify a 
mandatory class if allowing individual suits could substantially impair the ability of the claimants to 
protect their interests, id. 23(b)(1), and mandatory class actions are commonly used when the 
defendant does not have enough money to pay all plaintiffs. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.04, at 118 (2009) (“Indivisible remedies also may arise with 
regard to the distribution of a limited fund. In this situation, any distribution as to one claimant 
invariably affects all other claimants’ potential recovery.”). 
178. Creditors may be forced to bring a series of class actions because workers, retirees, and 
bondholders could not be placed in the same class, but these creditors should not be placed in the 
same class in bankruptcy either. See infra notes 197–205 and accompanying text. 
179. Class members rarely vote on a settlement offer, but judges will consider the amount of 
opposition to a settlement of a plan as an important factor in their decision. See CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797.1, at 106–07 (3d ed. 2005) (“Another 
important factor for the court to consider is whether there is any opposition to the proposed 
settlement and, if so, what the objections are.”). Although the views of the majority (or super-
majority) of plaintiffs will not bind the judge in a class action, a bankruptcy vote does not fully bind 
the judge either. Even if a super-majority of creditors within a bankruptcy class approves a plan, a 
judge can still side with the minority and rule that the plan is not in the “best interests of the 
creditors.” 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2006). If a super-majority rejects the plan, the judge can still 
approve the plan by cramdown as long as at least one class of impaired creditors votes in favor of 
the plan. Id. § 1129(b). 
180. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the Supreme Court limited the use of 
mandatory class actions to resolve mass tort litigation in part because it feared that this approach 
could evade creditor protections provided by the bankruptcy code. Id. at 860 n.34 (“[I]t is worth 
noting that if limited fund certification is allowed in a situation where a company provides only a de 
minimis contribution to the ultimate settlement fund . . . [it] significantly undermine[s] the 
protections for creditors built into the Bankruptcy Code.”). The settlement of a mandatory class 
action that complied with bankruptcy’s fairness and equal treatment principles would not raise the 
same concerns, particularly when the debtor (the state) does not have access to bankruptcy. A court 
may be reluctant to allow a settlement of a mandatory class that binds bondholders as this would 
effectively serve to modify the bond indenture and conflict with the principle that the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure cannot alter substantive rights. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
613 (1997). This problem is not insurmountable. First, the amount states owe to bondholders is 
small relative to the amount they owe to pensioners and other creditors. Second, a settlement 
between the state and bondholders could take the form of a statute that modified their rights. Rather 
than approve a settlement that deprived an individual of the right to sue, the judge could rule that the 
statute did not violate the Contract Clause. 
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a race to the assets.181 These techniques would not offer complete 
finality, however, because they would not preclude claims brought by 
those not party to the actions.182 However, this lack of preclusion may 
not be as significant as it would appear. Assume that the Supreme Court 
were to uphold a modification of creditors’ rights against a state. 
Creditors who were not party to the litigation would be free to bring 
their own claim. However, given the binding precedent, these creditors 
would have very little chance of success unless they had a very different 
argument. 
IV. SYNTHETIC BANKRUPTCY MAY BE A GOOD SUBSTITUTE 
FOR FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY 
Part III suggests that a state could use existing law to create a 
synthetic bankruptcy mechanism to resolve its financial distress. This 
Part compares the synthetic approach to reform proposals advanced by 
other scholars. Section A argues that if a state truly needs a bankruptcy 
mechanism to resolve its financial distress, this mechanism must be 
more robust than the minimalist mechanism proposed by Professor 
Schwarcz. Section B asks whether a new bankruptcy mechanism for 
states should be created as part of the federal bankruptcy code (federal 
bankruptcy) or created by the states themselves (synthetic bankruptcy). 
A. Minimalist Bankruptcy Is Likely to Be Either Unnecessary or 
Insufficient 
Although the literature on state bankruptcy is relatively new, an 
extensive literature on borrowing by sovereign nations has generated a 
number of bankruptcy proposals. Most of the proposals contain some 
combination of the following elements: (i) the ability to grant post-
petition borrowing priority over existing debt, (ii) a collective voting 
procedure that allows a super-majority of creditors to bind dissenters 
with similar rights, (iii) a stay that would suspend enforcement efforts by 
creditors, and (iv) judicial power to approve (or “cramdown”) a plan 
over the objection of a class of dissenting creditors if the plan meets 
substantive standards.183 Steven Schwarcz recently proposed a 
“minimalist” state bankruptcy system that would contain only the first 
                                                     
181. For a discussion of these techniques, see McKenzie, supra note 18.  
182. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008). 
183. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of 
Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2004). 
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two elements; his system would authorize the court to grant post-petition 
borrowing priority over existing debt and allow a super-majority vote of 
bondholders to bind dissenters.184 His proposal would not include an 
automatic stay or a cramdown mechanism. It also would not include the 
power to alter collective bargaining agreements, pensions, or other 
benefits owed to former workers. 
Professor Schwarcz makes a strong case for his proposal, but 
ultimately it may be insufficient or unnecessary. That question depends 
on one’s assumptions about the ability of a creditor to enforce claims 
against a state outside of bankruptcy and the nature of an insolvent 
state’s balance sheet. Schwarcz argues that his bankruptcy proposal is 
needed to solve the standard collective action problem among 
creditors,185 thus asserting that non-bankruptcy mechanisms cannot 
control this problem. However, states have relatively little trade-debt, 
and they issue their bonds pursuant to indentures that determine when an 
individual creditor can sue or take other enforcement efforts. In theory, a 
state could avoid the collective action problem among its bondholders by 
issuing all of its bonds pursuant to a single indenture, requiring a 
creditor vote before any bondholder can sue, and by allowing a majority 
or super-majority to consent to the modification of the terms of the loan. 
Schwarcz argues that bankruptcy is needed because existing bond 
indentures too often require unanimous consent for some modifications, 
and because states frequently issue debt pursuant to multiple 
indentures.186 
Professor Schwarcz recognizes that sovereign nations have developed 
a potential non-bankruptcy solution to this problem—the exchange offer 
with exit consents.187 Although indentures usually require unanimous 
consent for some modifications (e.g. a reduction in the amount of 
principal owed), they allow a super-majority vote to approve other 
modifications of the indenture.188 In an exchange offer, the debtor offers 
                                                     
184. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 331 (“A minimalist legal framework incorporating across-
the-board supermajority voting is all that would be required to help states solve the creditor-holdout 
problem. . . . It nonetheless would be desirable for the framework to also include a mechanism that 
enables states to obtain needed liquidity during the debt-restructuring process.”) (footnotes omitted).  
185. See id. at 328 (“The central problem faced by debtors attempting to restructure their debt—
and thus likely to be faced also by debtor-states attempting to restructure their debt—is the 
‘creditor-holdout’ problem, a type of collective action problem.”). 
186. See id. at 330–31. 
187. Id. at 330. For a more thorough description of the use of exchange offers with exit consents, 
see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 59 (2000). 
188. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 187, at 65 (“[C]lauses preclude any changes to the 
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to exchange new bonds, with new terms, for the old, provided that the 
creditor votes to strip the old bonds of many of the creditor protections 
such as the waiver of sovereign immunity and a pledge not to grant more 
favorable terms to subsequent debt.189 A holdout strategy is now much 
less attractive as the holdout would be left with a bond with few 
protections. A state could use an exchange offer to convert its existing 
bonds into a series of bonds issued pursuant to a single indenture that 
allowed collective voting. It could thereby replicate the collective 
decision-making of Schwarcz’s minimalist bankruptcy. Schwarcz 
suggests that this strategy may not succeed because a court may 
invalidate an exchange offer as unfair to the creditors.190 
Note that the ability of a dissenting creditor to sue explains both the 
race to the assets justification for bankruptcy and Schwarcz’s 
explanation for why an exchange offer will fail to control the problem. If 
we believe that states can use the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign 
immunity to prevent their bondholders from suing, states would not need 
even a minimalist bankruptcy.191 A state could simply refuse to pay the 
holdout. The creditor could still report a default and damage the state’s 
reputation, but bankruptcy does not generally try to prevent this harm.192 
If we believe that courts will enforce the promises that states have 
made, then Schwarcz’s proposal does not go far enough.193 Most 
critically, he restricts his proposal to bondholders and similar general 
debt obligations, and he would not allow his minimalist bankruptcy to 
                                                     
payment terms of the bonds . . . without the consent of each affected bondholder. But any other 
provision of the bond can be amended with the consent of the issuer and . . . holders representing 
only 66 2/3 percent of the outstanding amount of the bonds. Many sovereign bonds set this 
threshold as low as 50 percent.”).  
189. Id. at 81–82. 
190. Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 330 (“Even if this strategy otherwise works, however, questions 
remain of the extent to which it represents unenforceable coercion.”) (footnote omitted). 
191. If sovereign immunity prevents all enforcement, it makes no sense to speak of legal priority 
for post-petition lending. However, this does not mean that distressed lenders cannot be given 
effective priority. For example, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) serves as a lender of last 
resort for sovereign nations, and nations almost always repay the IMF in full. See Kenneth S. 
Rogoff, Moral Hazard in IMF Loans: How Big a Concern?, FIN. & DEV., Sept. 2002, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2002/09/rogoff.htm#author (“[T]he actual realized 
historical default rate [on IMF loans] is virtually nil.”).  
192. If the debtor is a consumer, other laws may try to limit the damage that a filing does to the 
debtor’s reputation. Most importantly, the Fair Credit Reporting Act will limit the period in which a 
bankruptcy or other default can appear on a credit report. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1681–91 (2006). 
193. I am assuming that courts would not allow the bondholders to sue and refuse to allow other 
creditors to sue.  
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adjust the rights of current or former workers.194 One could argue that, as 
a matter of policy, courts should force bondholders to forgive some of 
their debts before they adjust workers’ rights.195 However, debt service 
(as traditionally defined) accounts for a rather insignificant share (3% to 
6%) of existing state budgets.196 Unless the nature of state liabilities 
changes radically, bankruptcy must address the rights of current and 
former workers if it is to have a meaningful effect on a state’s finances. 
A voting mechanism may help solve the collective action problem 
among former workers (pensioners). Unions already serve to mitigate 
the collective action problem among current workers. But bankruptcy 
still needs some mechanism to address the holdout problem among the 
various groups of creditors. Federal bankruptcy allows a super-majority 
vote to bind the minority,197 but only if the interests of the majority and 
minority are (or ought to be) aligned. In existing federal bankruptcy 
reorganization procedures, voting is done by class, and either all classes 
must approve a plan or a plan must be approved by cramdown.198 All 
claims in a class must be “substantially similar”199 and must receive 
equal (not merely equivalent) treatment.200 Bondholders, current 
workers, and pensioners could not be placed in a single class and thus 
could not vote as a single group. These various creditors may have 
legally similar claims if non-bankruptcy law does not give any of them 
special priority. A judge could address any unique issues for each 
creditor (e.g. valuing each pensioner’s future stream of payments) when 
allowing their claim,201 and could address the collective bargaining 
                                                     
194. See Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 345 (“On balance, therefore, this Article proposes that the 
framework not include an explicit right to impair state collective bargaining and pension 
agreements.”). 
195. States seem to be moving in the opposite direction; Rhode Island recently passed a statute 
giving municipal bondholders priority over all other creditors, including workers. See Michael 
McDonald, David McLaughlin & Laura Keeley, Central Falls Bankruptcy Casts Shadow Over 
Rhode Island Pensions, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 2, 2011, 8:50 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-02/central-falls-bankruptcy-driven-by-pensions-casts-
shadow-over-rhode-island.html. 
196. See supra notes 3, 53 and accompanying text. 
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (requiring the affirmative vote of more than one-half of the 
number of claims in a class and two-thirds of the value of the claims in a class). 
198. Id. § 1129(a)(10), (b). These sections are imported into Chapter 9 by Section 901. Id. 
§ 901(a). Creditors do not vote at all in the individual reorganization procedure (Chapter 13) or the 
procedure designed for family farmers (Chapter 12). 
199. Id. § 1122. 
200. Id. § 1123(a)(4). 
201. Id. § 502. 
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agreements prior to the adoption of the plan of reorganization.202 A 
bankruptcy mechanism that did this would be far from minimalist. The 
valuation of pensions would demand the exercise of substantial 
discretion,203 and judicial approval of the rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement requires the implementation of a difficult 
balancing test that resembles cramdown.204 More seriously, bankruptcy 
insists that members of a single class receive equal treatment. A state 
bankruptcy could not place pensioners and bondholders in the same class 
unless it would give new bonds to the former, or pensions to the latter.205 
If each group of creditors must consent to an adjustment of their 
rights, the collective action problem returns. The bondholders, current 
workers, and pensioners each have an incentive to refuse a modification 
and hope that the others will bear the burden of keeping the state solvent. 
Courts can mitigate this collective action problem by forcing a 
dissenting group to accept a modification.206 This is the power of 
cramdown. 
B. Federal Bankruptcy May Offer No Real Advantages Over Synthetic 
Bankruptcy 
Part III suggests that a state could synthesize its own “bankruptcy” 
mechanism if the federal government does not add a bankruptcy chapter 
under which a state could file. This subsection asks whether the federal 
government should add such a chapter, or if, as George Triantis argues, 
it should step back and let the states create their own composition 
mechanisms.207 The crux of his argument is that states should be allowed 
to choose their own resolution method as part of a contract with their 
                                                     
202. Id. § 364; In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 177 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009). 
203. The workers’ pensions are contingent claims; their value depends on how long the workers 
will live. A bankruptcy court can estimate the value of these claims, but doing so requires 
substantial discretion. The current bankruptcy code provides the court with very little guidance as to 
how it should conduct this analysis. See 11 U.S.C. § 502. 
204. See supra note 136 and the accompanying text. 
205. A state bankruptcy may even need multiple classes of pensions and workers. Judges, 
teachers, firefighters, police officers, and lifeguards do not generally share collective bargaining 
agreements or pensions. Indeed, states often have different pensions for the same types of workers 
depending on when they were hired. 
206. The cramdown power should play a far more important role in Chapter 11. If capital markets 
are liquid, a court supervising a Chapter 11 reorganization can effectively grant senior creditors 
control over the process if junior claimants fail to redeem the senior claims. See Richard M. Hynes, 
Reorganization as Redemption, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 183 (2011). This approach will not work in a 
state or municipal bankruptcy because senior creditors cannot take control of the process.  
207. See Triantis, supra note 20.  
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creditors,208 but a federal bankruptcy chapter for insolvent states may 
actually enhance the state’s ability to contract. David Skeel, on the other 
hand, argues for a federal bankruptcy chapter applicable to states.209 His 
argument is based in part on federal bankruptcy’s ability to solve 
misallocations of power that can prevent a timely reorganization.210 
However, a bankruptcy chapter that significantly reallocates power 
within a state would likely be held unconstitutional. The case for a 
federal bankruptcy chapter for states must ultimately rest on the 
likelihood that it would resolve a state’s insolvency at a lower cost than 
a mechanism created by the state itself. However, in a world of 
imperfect judges, larger transactions costs can increase efficiency ex 
ante by enhancing the ability of a state to make credible commitments. 
1. The Contractarian Argument for Synthetic Bankruptcy 
A number of scholars have argued that the law should allow 
businesses211 or individuals212 to contract in advance for the resolution 
mechanism that will apply after default. These arguments suggest that 
the debtor is in a better position to balance the need to reorganize after a 
fiscal shock against the increased cost of capital caused by generous debt 
relief terms. George Triantis extends this contractarian argument to the 
states, arguing that the federal government should step back and let each 
state choose its own resolution mechanism.213 
Many reject the contractarian approach to bankruptcy. In fact, few, if 
any, scholars advocate for a strictly contractarian approach to individual 
bankruptcy. Individuals may suffer from cognitive failures (e.g. they 
                                                     
208.  Id. at 243 (“State legislators, in contrast, would internalize the cost of bankruptcy legislation 
borne by some constituencies because the market for state debt, as well as for workers, would 
‘price’ each state’s bankruptcy choice.”). 
209. See Skeel, supra note 2. 
210. Id. at 715 (“[B]ankruptcy could alter the political dynamics in several ways.”). 
211. See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad, in 
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 311, 319–20 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 53–
54 (1992) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice]; Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., 
The Economic Analysis of Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 96–101 
(1995); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. 
REV. 515, 529–34 (1999) (reviewing the literature); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Contracting 
Reviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343 (1999); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business 
Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1836–38 (1998); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 
13 J. L. ECON. ORG. 127, 129 (1997). 
212. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 38 (questioning whether individuals should be able to waive 
the right to file for bankruptcy). 
213. See Triantis, supra note 20, at 240.  
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may fail to properly discount future values) that prevent them from 
choosing the correct resolution mechanism.214 State politicians may 
suffer from these failures as well, but shifting the responsibility for 
choosing a bankruptcy mechanism to the federal level just replaces one 
set of politicians with another. 
Eric Posner offers a different justification for mandatory bankruptcy 
rules for individuals.215 According to his theory, the non-waivable right 
to seek a discharge, and similar laws, helps solve a version of the 
Samaritan’s dilemma. The government cannot commit to withhold 
assistance from those in need, and this may cause citizens to engage in 
behavior (such as excessive borrowing) that makes financial need more 
likely.216 The government can mitigate this problem by mandating 
generous terms of debt relief as this shifts some of the cost to the 
citizen’s creditors and thus makes borrowing more expensive.217 
Similarly, the federal government may be unable to commit to withhold 
assistance to a state in financial distress. The federal government can 
mitigate the moral hazard created by the prospect of a federal bailout by 
mandating generous terms of debt relief and shifting some of the cost of 
financial collapse to the state’s creditors. In doing so, the federal 
government exploits an inconsistency in the state’s preferences across 
time. At the time of borrowing, the state would like to credibly grant the 
creditors strong collection rights and thereby obtain better credit terms. 
If the federal government creates a bankruptcy chapter for states or 
allows the state to retract waivers of sovereign immunity, it can prevent 
the state from making these credible commitments. Once the credit has 
been extended and the state enters financial distress, it has an incentive 
to go back on its prior commitments and choose the most beneficial 
resolution terms available. 
The argument most commonly raised against a contractarian approach 
to business bankruptcy is that such schemes will harm trade creditors 
and tort victims. Critics argue that firms will grant senior creditors 
unduly strong collection rights because the senior creditors’ increased 
recoveries will come at the expense of tort victims and trade creditors, 
                                                     
214. See Jackson, supra note 81. 
215. Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 
(1995). 
216. Id. at 283 (“The provision of welfare in a free market produces perverse incentives to take 
credit risks, which both drive up the cost of the welfare system and undermine its goal of poverty 
reduction.”). 
217. Id. at 293 (“One approach to this policy is simply the nonenforcement of contracts extending 
high-risk credit to the poor.”). 
Hynes-FINAL Word 1.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/26/2012  5:27 PM 
2012] STATE DEFAULT AND SYNTHETIC BANKRUPTCY 697 
 
who cannot adjust their credit terms to reflect this fact.218 One can debate 
the empirical importance of this argument in the context of firms,219 but 
states have little trade debt and few tort claims.220 States do owe 
substantial amounts to current and former workers, but these workers are 
well represented by unions who can, and do, monitor state laws that can 
affect the rights of their members. 
The contractarian argument assumes that a state can commit to use a 
particular resolution mechanism in a future financial crisis. To the extent 
that a state can create a new mechanism just before default and apply its 
terms to existing debts, the state is unable to make this commitment. 
Creditors will not reward a state for choosing creditor-friendly resolution 
terms (no composition mechanism) because the state could change to a 
less creditor-friendly mechanism (composition mechanism) when the 
crisis actually occurs. The Contract Clause may place some limit on the 
retroactive application of a state composition mechanism, but the 
Depression-era Supreme Court has already upheld a composition 
mechanism for pre-existing municipal debt.221 A modern court may be 
more reluctant to uphold a retroactive composition mechanism for the 
state’s own debt, but given that it has been more than 100 years since a 
state has defaulted on its bonds,222 this is very hard to predict. A court 
may well conclude that a future fiscal crisis is sufficiently severe and 
unexpected to make a retroactive mechanism “reasonable and 
necessary,” and thus permissible under United States Trust Co. of New 
York v. New Jersey.223 
A federal bankruptcy chapter may actually enhance a state’s ability to 
contract for debt relief (by preempting state resolution mechanisms) and 
still leave the states with substantial discretion to choose the terms of 
their own resolution. A state bankruptcy chapter could follow the 
                                                     
218. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Contract Bankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 
317 (1999); Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Contracting Out of Bankruptcy: An 
Empirical Intervention, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (2005).  
219. See Yair Litsokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in 
Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 DUKE L.J. 1037 (2008). 
220. Tort victims have, however, played an important role in municipal bankruptcy. See Gillette, 
supra note 106, at 100 (“The precipitating cause of bankruptcy has tended to be . . . one-off events 
such as tort damage awards that have constituted a substantial percentage of the insolvent 
municipality’s budget.”). Note that Gillette offers this fact as a reason for why municipal 
bankruptcy may offer limited guidance for a state bankruptcy. Id.  
221. See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 508–09 (1942) 
(upholding a state created composition mechanism that applied to pre-existing municipal debt). 
222. See English, supra note 6 (discussing state defaults in the nineteenth century). 
223. 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).  
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example of municipal bankruptcy (Chapter 9) and respect the priority of 
revenue bonds,224 allowing the state to balance its need for debt relief 
against the cost of capital. It could also go much further, allowing the 
state to choose among a menu of procedural options.225 Federal 
preemption of state composition mechanisms would not completely 
solve the state’s commitment problem; the state could still claim 
sovereign immunity or use statutes to amend the rights of its creditors 
and defend itself against Contract Clause challenges. But these strategies 
could be costly. At least one scholar has argued that the Supreme Court 
would uphold a contractual waiver of sovereign immunity,226 and the 
nineteenth-century experience demonstrates that a state can effectively 
waive this immunity if it is sufficiently creative when designing its 
bonds.227 Even if a state does not successfully waive its sovereign 
immunity, invoking this immunity could be quite costly in terms of 
reputational and transaction costs.228 Congress could draft a preemption 
provision to make it more difficult for a state to change its creditors’ 
rights by statute. Even without such a provision, courts may be more 
reluctant to find such statutes to be a “reasonable and necessary” 
response to a financial crisis if a bankruptcy chapter is available.229 
2. Federal Bankruptcy and the Allocation of Power 
Substantial political hurdles may prevent a state from creating its own 
composition mechanism or changing non-bankruptcy laws to modify 
creditors’ rights. Most of these changes would require the enactment of 
state statutes, and either the governor or members of the legislature may 
oppose the legislation. Still other changes would require amendments to 
the state constitution, which in turn might require the vote of a skeptical 
electorate. The structure of some state governments may be too 
dysfunctional to allow the timely enactment of these changes during a 
financial crisis. Unfortunately, the process of proposing a plan of 
reorganization within a federal bankruptcy system may prove just as 
difficult unless federal bankruptcy reallocates power within a state. 
                                                     
224. 11 U.S.C. § 928 (2006).  
225. For a menu approach to corporate bankruptcy, see Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice, supra note 
211. 
226. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
227. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
228. After its default, the State of Mississippi faced litigation over the extent of its sovereign 
immunity for nearly 100 years. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
229. See United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977). 
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David Skeel has proposed a new bankruptcy mechanism that would do 
just this, vesting the authority to file for bankruptcy and propose a plan 
of reorganization to the state’s governor, giving the legislature at most 
the right to consult.230 His mechanism may not survive a constitutional 
challenge for precisely this reason.231 
An improper allocation of power can also inhibit the prompt 
resolution of a financially distressed firm. Bankruptcy solves this 
problem by reallocating control. Outside of bankruptcy, managers enjoy 
substantial control, but their power has limits. A manager cannot sell 
substantially all of a firm’s assets without shareholder approval.232 Many 
firms enter bankruptcy because of a failed business model, and the best 
option is to sell the assets to someone who can put the assets to better 
use. Shareholders of an insolvent firm may oppose a quick sale because 
absolute priority requires that they receive none of the proceeds. If the 
firm continues to operate, there is at least some chance that the firm 
could return to solvency and the shareholders will receive something. 
There may be a greater chance that the firm’s insolvency will deepen, 
but once the firm is insolvent this loss is borne by the creditors. 
Bankruptcy can solve the misallocation of power within a firm 
through a reorganization that eliminates the old shareholders and allows 
new shareholders (the former creditors) to vote on the sale. The 
reorganization process takes time, and the value of the firm’s assets 
could drop sharply during the delay. Bankruptcy, therefore, reallocates 
power to allow managers to sell all of the assets of their firms without 
any investor or creditor consent as long as they convince a judge that 
there is a valid business reason to do so.233 Many high-profile 
bankruptcies, such as those of Chrysler and General Motors, resolve the 
firm with a sale of substantially all of the firm’s assets, and these sales 
are typically justified by the argument that rapid depreciation makes 
such sales a necessity.234 
                                                     
230. See Skeel, supra note 2, at 716 (“Congress might vest this authority directly in the governor, 
perhaps together with an obligation for the governor to consult with the legislature.”). 
231. Michael McConnell questions whether any state bankruptcy mechanism would survive a 
constitutional challenge that argued that state sovereignty is designed to protect the individual and 
therefore cannot be waived by a state government. See Michael W. McConnell, Extending 
Bankruptcy Law to States, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS 
FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL CRISIS 229, 234–35 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, 
Jr. eds., 2012). 
232. See, e.g., Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004), appeal 
denied, 871 A.2d 1128 (Del. Super. Ct. 2004). 
233. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006); In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983). 
234. See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated sub nom. Ind. State 
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One could adapt this argument for states. State law can allocate power 
in a way that prevents a prompt response to a fiscal crisis. State law may, 
for example, require a super-majority vote to raise taxes235 or require a 
change in the state constitution to alter the rights of bondholders or 
workers.236 While a state’s executive, legislature, and electorate could 
make these changes, they may be unable to do so with sufficient speed. 
Moreover, their failure to act could impose costs on the rest of the nation 
through financial contagion. Because of the risk of this contagion, 
central governments cannot credibly commit to refuse a bailout of local 
governments, and this creates a moral hazard by reducing the incentive 
that local governments have to avoid financial distress.237 
States have used these external costs to justify the seizure of broad 
fiscal authority over financially troubled municipalities.238 Clay Gillette 
recently used the moral hazard argument to advocate for greater federal 
control (through a bankruptcy judge) of a municipality’s finances.239 
These externality and moral hazard arguments are not unique to 
municipalities; they could also be used to justify federal control over a 
state’s finances.240 David Skeel does in fact make this argument in a 
recent article, and proposes mechanisms by which the federal 
government could exert control over the states.241 One of the proposed 
mechanisms is a structured non-bankruptcy workout in which Congress 
procures the cooperation of state political actors by conditioning federal 
aid on various changes, much as Congress conditions federal aid on a 
state’s participation in programs like Medicare.242 This proposal is not a 
bankruptcy mechanism,243 but Skeel’s other two proposals are. One is a 
                                                     
Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009) (vacating as moot). 
235. See supra Part I. 
236. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3(a). 
237. See, e.g., Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with 
Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD 
BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35 (Jonathan A. Rodden et al. eds., 2003). 
238. See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, New York State Seizes Finances of Nassau County, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1, available at    
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/nyregion/27nassau.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss. 
239. See Gillette, supra note 148, at 283 (“In this article, I suggest that allowing bankruptcy 
courts to impose resource adjustments serves to neutralize the strategic behavior of local officials 
and thus encourages localities to internalize the costs of their activities in a manner more consistent 
with the tenets of fiscal federalism.”). Gillette defines resource adjustments to mean higher taxes or 
reduced services. Id.  
240. Id. at 329–30. 
241. See Skeel, supra note 2. 
242. Id. at 726–35. 
243. To the extent that the aid offered to the state takes the form of a bailout, it creates a moral 
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simplified version of bankruptcy modeled after a consumer Chapter 7 
filing that would automatically discharge all of a state’s obligations 
except those that the state explicitly reaffirms.244 This proposal is 
designed to shift the burden away from a default rule of payment toward 
a default rule of non-payment. The same groups that had the power to 
prevent a state from adopting non-bankruptcy code solutions to the crisis 
may be able to prevent the state from filing for bankruptcy. 
Alternatively, political stasis could prevent the state from reaffirming 
any of its obligations, thereby making bankruptcy much less attractive. 
As discussed above, Skeel’s third alternative addresses this issue by 
substantially reallocating decision-making authority within the state. 
Under his proposal, Congress would vest the power to file for 
bankruptcy and propose a restructuring plan with the governor, giving 
the legislature at most the right to consult.245 
While Skeel’s proposals reallocate political power within the 
bankrupt political entity, the existing chapter for municipal bankruptcy 
tries to minimize the role of the judge and the reallocation of control. 
Unlike other bankrupt debtors, municipalities do not need judicial 
approval of their borrowing or spending,246 and section 904 prohibits the 
court from interfering with “any of the political or governmental powers 
of the debtor.”247 Section 943(b)(6) requires a bankrupt municipality to 
obtain the regulatory or electoral approval that non-bankruptcy requires, 
in order to carry out its reorganization plan.248 Congress included this 
provision to preserve “[s]tate and local financial and political controls 
[and to avoid] constitutional issues as to the scope of the bankruptcy 
power.”249 
Some reallocation of power in bankruptcy is inevitable,250 but the 
                                                     
hazard that makes insolvency more likely. 
244. Id. at 716 (“First, Congress could adopt a simple, severe bankruptcy framework that 
automatically discharged all of a state’s obligations shortly after it filed for bankruptcy.”). 
245. Id. (“Congress might vest this authority directly in the governor, perhaps together with an 
obligation for the governor to consult with the legislature.”). 
246. Section 363(b)(1) requires notice and a hearing before the debtor may use property outside 
of the ordinary course of business, and section 363(c)(1) allows the judge to prohibit the debtor 
from entering transactions in the ordinary course of business. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006). Similarly, 
section 364 requires notice and a hearing before the debtor can incur obligations outside the 
ordinary course of business and allows the judge to prohibit the debtor from incurring debt in the 
ordinary course of business. Id. However, the relevant portions of these sections do not apply in 
Chapter 9. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2006). 
247. Id. § 904(1). 
248. Id. § 943(b)(6). 
249. S. REP. NO. 100-506, at 11 (1988). 
250. Section 943(b)(4) states that the court cannot confirm a plan if “the debtor is . . . prohibited 
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reallocation that occurs in Chapter 9 is consistent with the plenary power 
that states enjoy over their municipalities. As noted above, a state can 
use these powers to seize control over insolvent municipalities outside of 
bankruptcy.251 States must specifically authorize the filing of bankruptcy 
petitions by their municipalities.252 One could argue that by doing so 
they are exercising their right to change the political dynamic within the 
municipality. 
The use of a federal law to reallocate power within a state would 
generate much more serious opposition because the federal government 
does not enjoy plenary power over the states.253 States are not creations 
of the federal government, and the federal government’s seizure of 
control of a state due to fiscal crisis could be viewed as a violation of 
state sovereignty. This approach would be very different from programs 
like Medicare or unemployment insurance that procure state cooperation 
through conditional grants. Although federal law sets the conditions for 
a state’s participation, state law determines which state actors decide 
whether to accept the federal funds.254 This principle is illustrated by the 
dispute between the governor and legislature of South Carolina in 2009 
over whether to accept stimulus money. Although the Stimulus Act 
purported to determine which political branch of a state government 
could apply for the funds (allowing the legislature to apply for the funds 
if the governor refused),255 the Supreme Court of South Carolina was 
                                                     
by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(4) (2006). Read 
broadly, this provision would prevent a bankruptcy court from impairing any creditor’s claims as 
long as they are enforceable outside of bankruptcy. Courts have refused to adopt this reading, 
however, and have instead interpreted the language to limit the ability of the bankruptcy court to 
exempt the municipality from complying with state law in the future. See In re Sanitary & 
Improvement Dist. No. 7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra 
note 163, at ¶ 943.03[4]. This contrasts with Chapter 11 that allows a bankruptcy plan to override 
applicable state laws even after the debtor emerges from bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. 1142(a) (2006). 
251. See supra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (describing a Michigan statute granting the 
state the authority to seize control of insolvent municipalities). 
252. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
253. The Reconstruction era provides some precedent for congressional control over state 
government. Congress removed the existing civilian governments, created military governments, 
and conducted elections, citing their obligation to ensure a republican form of government. See, e.g., 
Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional 
Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 540–42 (1962).  
254. See D. Cody Huffaker, A New Type of Commandeering: The Bypass Clause of the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Stimulus Package), 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1055, 1056 (“The 
power to accept federal funds is a question of state law, and the state executive is usually the entity 
empowered to accept such funds.”) (footnote omitted).  
255. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–5, § 1607(b), 123 Stat. 
115, 304 (2009).  
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able to avoid “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”256 by 
adopting an interpretation of the statute that left the decision to state law. 
3. The Role of Transactions Costs 
If bankruptcy takes a robust view of state sovereignty, the case for 
amending the code to allow a state to file rests on transactions costs. A 
state composition mechanism cannot bind out-of-state creditors who do 
not subject themselves to the court’s jurisdiction.257 If the state did not 
adopt a composition mechanism, the transactions costs could be much 
higher because courts may not be able to combine all suits in a single 
forum. Most suits would not raise federal questions under the well-
pleaded complaint rule.258 While suits by some types of plaintiffs 
(bondholders, perhaps pensioners) may satisfy diversity requirements, 
suits by other types of plaintiffs (current workers) probably would not. 
By contrast, state courts may lack the ability to bind out-of-state 
plaintiffs within a single class without giving class members the chance 
to opt out.259 Courts have sometimes overcome these obstacles through 
mutual cooperation in the mass torts context,260 but there is no guarantee 
that they will cooperate during a state insolvency. 
Proceeding under the bankruptcy code would also provide access to 
specialized courts that are well suited to this litigation. Regular courts 
may not have experience resolving insolvent governments and thus may 
not have specific knowledge about the relevant substantive issues. 
However, bankruptcy courts regularly manage reorganizations with 
competing classes. Moreover, if a state were truly insolvent, many of its 
municipalities would likely be insolvent as well. The resolution of these 
                                                     
256. Edwards v. State, 278 S.E.2d 412, 417 (S.C. 2009). 
257. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 358, 368–69 (1827) (holding that debts 
held by out-of-state creditors who had not voluntarily appeared in a state insolvency proceeding 
could not be discharged); see also Baldwin v. Hale, 98 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 227, 234 (1863) (holding 
that a state insolvency proceeding could not bind out-of-state creditors even when the contract was 
originally made in that state and would be enforced in that state); id. at 234 (indicating that legal 
notice cannot be given to the out-of-state creditor), discussed in Hollis R. Bailey, A Discharge in 
Insolvency, and its Effect on Non-Residents, 6 HARV. L. REV. 349, 352, 358 (1893) (taking issue 
with the general doctrine that a discharge would not bind a nonresident creditor unless he were 
personally served or voluntarily appeared). 
258. See, e.g., 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3566 
(3d ed. 2008). 
259. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (“Additionally, we hold that due 
process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove 
himself from the class by executing and returning an ‘opt out’ or ‘request for exclusion’ form to the 
court.”). 
260. See McKenzie, supra note 18. 
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entities would present common questions and thus it would make some 
sense to consolidate the litigation (at least as an administrative matter). 
Bankruptcy courts regularly manage the insolvency of related entities 
such as parent corporations and their subsidiaries. 
The fact that a federal bankruptcy chapter may operate with lower 
transactions costs does not necessarily imply that we should change the 
code to allow states to file. In a world of omniscient judges, transactions 
costs are to be avoided. As long as a judge approves plans only when 
they are in the “best interests of creditors,”261 we should make it as easy 
as possible for an insolvent state to modify its obligations. The judge 
will only let the state modify its obligations to the extent that it 
“deserves” to do so. If, however, judges are not omniscient, they may 
grant relief when they should not. Society may want to impose 
transactions costs (such as enhanced political costs from additional suits) 
to raise the cost of default and thereby enhance the state’s ability to 
make credible binding commitments. Large transactions costs may 
reduce efficiency ex post after default, but conversely they may raise 
efficiency ex ante. 
CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy is neither necessary nor sufficient to resolve a state fiscal 
crisis, but that does not mean that it should be avoided. Bankruptcy is 
not sufficient because it will almost certainly fail to address the 
structural problems (too much spending or too little taxation) that led to 
financial distress. However, the same is true of bankruptcy more 
generally. Bankruptcy judges do not find consumer debtors better jobs, 
heal their illnesses, or change their long-term spending habits. If 
bankruptcy can solve a collective action problem and provide struggling 
states a “fresh start” by freeing them of some of their obligations, it can 
facilitate a state’s recovery. 
Several factors may combine to make a state bankruptcy mechanism 
unnecessary. First, sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment 
may prevent creditors from suing the state to enforce their claims.262 
Second, much of the “state” debt is really owed by its municipalities, 
and existing law allows a state to force its municipalities into bankruptcy 
to reduce its expenses. Congress could facilitate the use of municipal 
bankruptcy to resolve a state’s insolvency by amending the definition of 
                                                     
261. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 943(b)(7), 1129(a)(7) (2006). 
262. See supra Part II.A. 
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“affiliate” to make it easier for a state to use this approach.263 Third, a 
state can create a close substitute for bankruptcy reorganization by 
enacting laws that modify the rights of its creditors and then using 
aggregate litigation methods to resolve the resulting Contract Clause 
disputes. At the extreme, a state could even create its own composition 
mechanism.264 
Significant differences would exist between a synthetic bankruptcy 
procedure created by a state and a new federal bankruptcy chapter, but it 
is not clear which approach we should prefer. George Triantis argues 
that states should be allowed effectively to contract with their creditors 
for the most efficient mechanism,265 but the existing interpretation of the 
Contract Clause may undermine the ability of states to credibly commit 
to a particular mechanism by allowing new laws to apply to existing 
debts.266 A federal bankruptcy chapter may enhance the ability of a state 
to contract with its creditors by limiting the state’s ability to change its 
laws in a time of financial crisis.267 David Skeel argues that a federal 
bankruptcy mechanism could reallocate power within a state in a manner 
that would allow for a more timely response to a budget crisis.268 
Unfortunately, this approach raises concerns over state sovereignty and 
may not survive a constitutional challenge. The best argument for a state 
federal bankruptcy chapter may rest on transactions costs. A federal 
bankruptcy court can more easily address all claims against the state in a 
single forum. However, in a world without omniscient judges, 
transactions costs can actually improve efficiency ex ante by allowing a 
state to make credible commitments. 
 
                                                     
263. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.  
264. See supra Part III.B. 
265. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
266. See, e.g., Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942) (upholding 
a state-created composition mechanism that applied to pre-existing municipal debt). 
267. Id. 
268. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
